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ABSTRACT 
 




This dissertation focuses on the economics of electricity generation. I aim to answer three main questions: 
After controlling for outside market forces, how did acid rain regulation impact Eastern coal production? 
How have the fundamental relationships in the natural gas market changed since deregulation, especially 
given the rise of production from shale resources? And how have sub-state policies affected the adoption 
of residential solar generation installations? For each question, I use economic tools to provide empirical 
answers which will contribute both to the academic literature as well as energy policy.  
 
My first essay looks at the coal production in the Eastern US from 1983-2012. It is widely understood that 
the quantity of coal produced in this region declined during this time period, though its causes are 
debated. While some have identified the cause to be outside economic forces, the prevailing view is that 
federal regulation was the main driver. By controlling for outside market forces, this paper is able to 
estimate the effect that the differing regulatory periods have had on coal production. Results demonstrate 
how in general the regulatory phases of the Acid Rain Program are associated with decreases in 
production in the Illinois and Appalachian basins, however with varying magnitudes. Further, there are 
some areas that saw some increases. The essay also measure the mitigating impact that the installation of 
‘scrubber’ units had on production. Overall, this essay provides a more nuanced look at the relationship 
between coal production and regulation during this time period.  
 
The second essay in this dissertation models the natural gas market. Since the complete deregulation of 
the market in 1993, there have been significant changes. Most notably, the rapid rise of production from 
shale resources has greatly increased the supply and decreased the price of the commodity. Where for 
many years a net importer, the US is now predicted to be a net exporter of natural gas within the next 
year. This massive change has altered the fundamental relationships in the market. This essay utilizes 
recently developed methodology to estimate how these relationships have changed over time. Further, 
given our research design we are able to estimate how the supply and demand elasticities have been 
influenced in the new era of abundant and cheap natural gas. Results provide a more nuanced view of the 
natural gas market, and allow for a better understanding of its drivers. 
 
My third essay measures the impact that certain policies have had in the residential solar market. 
Specifically, I estimate the impact on residential solar adoption associated with sub-state policies, enacted 
at the municipal, county, or utility level. To capture the clustering and peer effects in the adoption of 
residential solar that have been described in the literature, I utilize spatial econometric methods. To better 
model the nested nature of state and county renewable policies, a Bayesian hierarchical model is used. 
Results suggest that sub-state policies are associated with positive and significant increases in per-capita 






You learn a lot getting a PhD. I mean, that’s kind of the point. But along with all the math and theory, 
you’re given ample time to learn about the life choice you’re making. And now on my way out, I can tell 
you with a high degree of certainty: it’s a bad one.  
It’s not that the costs outweigh the benefits, though they are formidable: low pay, geographic and social 
isolation, being sent to the back of the prestige line. These of course were all known prior and definitely 
realized during. But while most say the long-term benefits will eventually pay off, it’s important to 
consider that they’re all conditional on passing. This is not the slightest bit guaranteed, much less in any 
reasonable time-frame. Pursing a doctorate is a bad choice because of how unbelievably lucky you need 
to be to actually finish.  
See, the thing is, your ideas are probably terrible. Solidarity: mine are too. We all tend to enjoy our own 
because we don’t really like to consider whether we’re wrong. The academic market for bad ideas is 
highly saturated, and to create anything different, you need a lot of help. Throughout my doctorate, I was 
extremely fortunate to have a small group of people who were willing and able to provide direction, 
clarification, and assistance. Without them, I would have been lost.  
I am forever indebted to Xiaoli. Obviously she managed to drag me through all the intellectual and 
administrative hurdles that accompany a dissertation, which by itself is no doubt an impressive feat. 
However my debt goes further. It is said that experts seek out those who are willing to be critical of them. 
This relationship being endogenous I guess is sort of the point of academia. On the other hand, like most 
novices I was incredibly receptive to any sort of positive encouragement, which she gave often. It is easy 
to say that without her constant support both my chances of completion and the quality of my work would 
have been significantly lower.  
The same can be said of the rest of my committee. Most of what I’ve learned about research and the field 
has come from working with Strat. His insights toward both remain invaluable. Don was by far the best 
teacher I’ve had in grad school, imparting more in one class than what I gained from most others. Levan 
was always supportive and helpful, particularly so with the job market. And Gerard consistently helped 
with all things departmental, providing both opportunity and resources a number of times over the past 
few years. I am grateful to have worked with each. 
While this professional guidance was necessary, it was certainly not sufficient. Grad school can be soul-
draining, and above all else I was extremely lucky to have a partner who supported me during these years. 
By providing a welcome distraction as well as mitigating both distance and stress, she provided a way to 
maintain sanity through all the volatility. To call her a diamond in the rough would involve two severe 
understatements. 
Having seen the risks associated with a doctorate, I maintain that pursing one was a bad choice. It would 
have been far too easy to fail or stagnate, as many have. Only with a considerable amount of assistance, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the electricity market, demand must be met by supply in every region at all times. Nearly all of the US 
economy is to some degree dependent on electricity being reliably available. This is true despite wide 
fluctuations in demand: daily, weekly, and seasonally as a whole consumers choose to use electricity at 
different rates. Meeting this demand involves a tremendous amount of financial resources. From the 
primary fuel discovery all the way to the transmission of electrons, the generation of electricity involves 
entire industries. In the latest data available from the US Energy Information Agency (EIA), energy 
expenditures represent 8.3% of all GDP in the US.  Historically, this value is higher: consumers have 
always been willing to trade other consumption for reliable heat and light. Demand is only projected to 
increase, as the EIA predicts residential, commercial, and industrial consumption to increase steadily 
through 2040 (EIA, 2015). There are significant revenues to be earned in meeting this demand.  
In this effort, the state of West Virginia has been front and center. The state has historically been in the 
center of a major producing region, the Appalachian basin. Its thick coal seams were relatively easy to 
exploit, and the coal produced fueled the industrialization of the US, as well as its westward expansion. 
Similar to its earlier era of timber production, laborers migrating to West Virginia had origins from all 
parts of the country and beyond. The extraction of coal made some rich, and provided many others a 
steady standard of living.  
However the state’s economy has suffered in the latter 20th and 21st centuries. Alongside the number of 
both direct and indirect jobs that were lost due to declining coal demand, there is a significant 
geographical component to the state’s problems as well. For the ease of access to coal resources, towns 
were built in remote locations with difficult access to other population centers. With that stream of 
revenue severely decreased, cities have a much harder time connecting with the main drivers of economic 
growth. Also with falling incomes and tax revenue from coal production social services like education 
and health care have declined. According to the Appalachian Regional Commission, 9 of West Virginia’s 
55 counties are considered ‘distressed’1. 
The coal industry has faced increasing scrutiny as understanding of the non-market costs of electricity 
production grows. There are important trade-offs between the generation electricity from nearly all 
sources and environmental quality, however those associated with the burning of coal. Air and water 
quality are severely impacted from both the extraction and burning of coal. Both of which have led to 
negative consequences to human health. Further, we now understand how the emission of carbon-dioxide 




and other heat-trapping greenhouse gasses (GHGs), in large from the burning of carbon-based fossil fuels, 
is causing global average temperatures to rise. Appropriately, significant attention is being paid to 
generation from coal-fired power plants, and numerous regulations now control most aspects of its 
production.  
The degree of which regulation affected the production of Appalachian and Illinois basin coal production 
is the subject of my second chapter. I examine the effects of regulation created by the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to combat acid rain. Created in the early 1990’s, the Acid Rain Program (ARP) 
limited the allowable levels of Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) content emittable by the worst polluting coal-fired 
power plants in Phase I, and the entirety of the market in Phase II. Unique to this program was the 
creation of a SO2 allowance permit market: firms with marginal costs of abatement higher than the permit 
price could by permits instead, while plants with lower marginal abatement costs could sell their permits. 
This ensured that abatement would come from the lowest cost producers. 
With Stratford Douglas, we measure the regulatory phase’ impact on coal production. While it is well 
established that the Eastern coal industry in the last 30 years has been in steady decline, it is less well 
understood whether market forces or regulation has been the cause. By controlling for market forces in a 
number of ways, we empirically demonstrate how most regulatory periods in most areas are associated 
with significant decreases. However we also demonstrate how the sulfur content dictated the magnitude 
of these decreases. In fact, some areas with sufficiently low sulfur content benefited from this regulation. 
These results provide a richer and more nuanced examination of the coal production market as well as the 
regulatory period’s effects.  
Looking forward, this general decline is projected to continue. At a time when electricity demand is 
expected to rise, expectations for coal demand do not (EIA, 2015). While some effort has been put forth 
towards the diversification of West Virginia’s economy, many here support the continued development of 
natural resources. Technology has helped. In 2007, the combined use of hydraulic fracturing and 
horizontal drilling made the extraction of natural gas and later oil from shale resources profitable. This 
has revolutionized the natural gas industry in the US: where once were predicted to need large imports of 
natural gas to meet demand, the US is now predicted to be a net exporter by 2017 (EIA, 2015). West 
Virginia sits on top of two shale plays, the Marcellus and Utica. Both the land purchases and the revenues 
generated from production have increased both employment and income in the Appalachian region 
(Padres et al, 2012). 
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However the impacts of this rapid increase in production on the US market have not been well studied. 
My third chapter aims to fill this gap. Together with Xiaoli Etienne, I apply recently developed techniques 
in time-series econometrics to the natural gas market. Using quarterly data from 1976-2015, we evaluate 
how the drivers of the natural gas market have changed since complete market deregulation, and 
disentangle supply and demand shocks in the market. Our results demonstrate the effects of unanticipated 
supply disruptions and price surges, as well as how they have changed over time. Through our research 
design we are also able to model the changes in the elasticities of demand and supply. These results 
provide a better picture of the natural gas market since the rise of domestic shale production, and help 
identify likely responses given future market disruptions.  
While arguably cleaner than coal, natural gas still is a non-renewable resource that emits climate-warming 
GHG’s into the atmosphere. Electricity generation from renewable sources is receiving significant 
attention. West Virginia does have a very small share of its electricity from hydroelectric and wind 
generation, however the opportunities for increased capacity are small: most optimal dam sites are already 
dammed, and only a small share of mountaintops provide sufficient wind potential to be attractive. 
Producing electricity from solar energy could be an attractive option for West Virginia. While not 
endowed with solar resources similar to the southwest part of the nation, there is sufficient potential to 
greatly increase capacity: Germany, with the resource potential roughly equivalent to Seattle or 
Anchorage, leads the world in installed solar capacity.  
To spur the installation of solar capacity, governments at various levels have enacted various policies 
aimed at solar adoption. Offering financial incentives has been one such policy: these subsidies 
effectively lower costs to consumers, which increased adoption. As the number of installations increased, 
economies of scale have led to costs reductions in solar panel production and installation, creating a 
positive feedback loop. Financial incentives and other policy instruments have been enacted from the 
federal government down to the municipality level.  
Chapter 4 examines the effectiveness of sub-state policies at incentivizing solar adoption. As a number of 
previous studies have noted the geographic neighborhood and peer-effects in solar adoption, I model this 
market using spatial econometric methods. Given the nested nature of renewable policies at the county 
and state level, I use a hierarchical model.  Results suggest that municipal, county, and utility policies 
have a positive and significant effects on the adoption of residential solar adoption. Further, the 
residential solar market exhibits a moderate but significant amount of spatial autocorrelation. These 
results help identify a previously overlooked main driver of the residential market, and suggest that it may 
be more beneficial for policy efforts be directed towards local governments. 
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This dissertation has taken a comprehensive view of the West Virginia energy production landscape. 
Historically, coal production has been dominant. My second chapter attempts to better understand how 
much of a role regulation has played in this decline, while controlling for market forces. An important 
market force in recent years has been the sharp increase in the production of natural gas, a topic at the 
heart of my third chapter. Here I comprehensively model the US natural gas market, and evaluate how the 
fundamental relationships have changed since the development of shale. If these two generation methods 
represent the past and present of West Virginia’s electricity production portfolio, renewables could be 
considered as its future. However the economics of renewable generation would need to change, as 
currently natural gas is generally a cheaper and a more reliable option. Inventive policies are needed to 
increase renewable generation. In my fourth chapter, I focus on the effect that municipal, county, and 
utility policies have on residential solar adoption. With this dissertation, researchers and policymakers 
will have a better understanding of West Virginia’s electricity production, and can better address the 














































Abstract: We analyze the effects of the EPA’s Acid Rain Program on county-level production of coals of 
varying sulfur content in the Appalachian and Illinois basins, controlling for Powder River Basin 
production, proximity of power plants to mines, and scrubber installation. Using a thirty-year panel data 
set, we find that during the Acid Rain Program coal sulfur content positively affected mine closure and 
negatively affected production in most coal-producing counties, with the greatest effect from 1995-2000. 
Estimated effects of power plant flue gas desulfurization equipment installation are substantial, and 
depend on coal sulfur content, scrubber unit size, and distance from the mines. The estimated elasticity of 
coal mine output to sulfur allowance price varies widely by coal sulfur content and is negative for mines 
producing coals above the 51th percentile in sulfur content. Our results complement previous studies of 
regulatory effectiveness, limiting the degree to which reductions in acid rain may be attributed to market 





By any measure, the U.S. coal industry has experienced an extended period of decline. Coal’s share of its 
primary U.S. market, electric power generation, declined from 57% in 1985 to 33% in 2015 (EIA).2 As 
figure 1 illustrates, coal production in the Appalachian and Illinois basins has declined since 1995, when 
Phase 1 of the EPA’s Acid Rain Program began. The decline of the industry has not been uniform, 
however. While overall Eastern coal production declined by 22% between 1990 and 2008, production of 
low-sulfur Western coal increased by 70% over the same period (EIA 2014a). Both regions have 
experienced a decline in production since 2007.  
 




The decline in coal’s overall electricity market share, and the displacement of Eastern coal by Western 
coal, coincided with the imposition of stricter air-quality regulations. Many residents of Eastern coal-
producing states attribute these changes to a “war on coal” perpetrated by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency and other federal agencies. But market forces have also driven both the decline of 
Eastern coal and the rise of low-sulfur Western coal. Wyoming’s Powder River Basin (PRB) coal mines 
are nearly ten times as productive as Appalachian mines on a tonnage basis (EIA 2014a), and PRB 
production costs are much lower. Furthermore, after 1980 railroad deregulation and technological 
innovation drove down the cost of long-haul rail transport, and operators of Midwestern and Eastern 
                                                     











































power plants adapted them to burn PRB coal more easily than some had expected. In the past ten years, 
market forces have continued to favor cleaner fuels as the shale gas revolution has driven natural gas 
prices down and production up.  
The economics literature has noted the role of market forces in the decline of sulfur emissions and the 
coal industry. In particular, Ellerman and Montero (1998) observed that many power plants not subject to 
clean-air regulations reduced their sulfur emissions voluntarily by switching to Wyoming coal between 
1985 and 1993, and concluded that economic forces were far more important than clean air regulations in 
motivating the move to Western coal. This conclusion has influenced subsequent researchers, surveyed in 
Schmalansee and Stavins (2013). The question of whether markets or regulation are more to blame for the 
decline of Eastern coal production is, however, still open.  
The literature has examined the effect of clean air regulations using data on power plant emissions, and on 
the eastward movement of Powder River Basin coal. We take a different approach, concentrating instead 
on county-level coal production within Eastern coal basins. Specifically, we examine county-level data on 
coal production within the Illinois and Appalachian basins from 1983-2012, taking into account variation 
in both sulfur content of coal mines in each county and installation of emissions control equipment in 
nearby power plants. This county-level “micro” approach has some advantages over studies such as 
Ellerman and Montero (1998) that focused on “macro” trends of Western versus Eastern coal production. 
On the macro level, it is especially difficult to empirically identify the separate effects of market and 
regulatory forces because both regulatory and market forces favor low-cost, low-sulfur Western coal. In 
contrast, production and transport cost differences within the Illinois and Appalachian basins are not so 
strongly biased in favor of low-sulfur coals.3 Consequently, it is easier to identify the effect of clean air 
regulations on coal production if the analysis concentrates on Eastern coal basins rather than the national 
market, as fewer confounding factors affect the analysis.  
If the shift to low-sulfur coal (and consequent reduction in acidic precipitation) were primarily driven by 
the lower cost of Western coals rather than Clean Air Act regulations, we would expect little variation in 
impact of regulations on production of Eastern coals of different sulfur content. On the contrary, our 
results indicate that clean air regulations had a significantly different impact on high-sulfur and low-sulfur 
coal mines in the Appalachian and Illinois basins. We present evidence that sulfur content positively 
affected mine closure in all regulatory phases after 1995. We also find evidence of a greater impact on 
production of coals of higher sulfur content over the entire period, with the greatest effect occurring from 
                                                     
3  Transport costs are a much smaller portion of the total cost of Eastern coals than Western coal. As to 
production costs, Eastern coals of all sulfur grades are mined in both open and underground mines, and the cost 
differences are much smaller within the Eastern basins than between Eastern and Western basins.  
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1995-2000. We estimate that clean air regulations were associated with reduced output in at least 86% of 
coal-producing counties in both Eastern basins during all regulatory periods. Estimated effects of power 
plant flue gas desulfurization equipment installation on coal production are very substantial, particularly 
in the Ohio River Valley, and depend on coal sulfur content, scrubber unit size, and distance from the 
mines. Finally, in separate estimates examining the relationship between coal mine output and the price of 
sulfur emissions allowances, and we find that the cross-price elasticity ranges from -0.5 to +1.0 
depending on sulfur content, with a negative elasticity appearing only for counties whose mines are above 
the 77th percentile in sulfur content.  
2. Background  
Congress passed Clean Air Act legislation in 1963 and 1970, and added significant amendments to the 
1970 Clean Air Act in 1977 and 1990. We focus on the consequences of the 1990 amendments, 
specifically the EPA’s implementation of those amendments in its Acid Rain Program (ARP) and 
successors. Our analysis distinguishes three distinct regulatory periods: Phase 1 (1995-1999), Phase 2 
(2000-2008), and the period we term “Post-2008,” extending from 2009 to the end of our data set in 2012. 
During Phase 1, the EPA required reduced SO2 emissions from fossil electric generating units in 110 
power plants, mostly older units, coal-fired, and lacking in pollution control equipment (Lange and 
Bellas, 2007). In Phase 2, the EPA widened its reach and tightened its standards, implementing a national 
emissions cap affecting 3200 units in nearly all US fossil-fuels plants (see Ellerman et al., 2000).  
Accompanying the emissions caps was an SO2 emissions trading program, authorized under Title IV of 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, as described by Schmalensee and Stavins (2013). This trading 
program functioned effectively from 1995 through 2007, and then declined in relevance after the D.C. 
Circuit Court’s ruling in State of North Carolina vs. EPA (2008), which vacated the EPA’s Clean Air 
Interstate Rule (CAIR) and led to the formulation of the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR). During 
this Post-2008 period, regulators’ increasing reliance on state-level emissions caps and command-and-
control regulatory methods to meet National Ambient Air Quality Standards caused average allowance 
prices to plunge from almost $400 in 2008, to $70 in 2009, to under $3 by 2011 (EIA, 2011). Technically, 
generators must still obtain allowances in order to emit SO2, but this requirement is non-binding, as 
available allowances provide for more emissions than are allowed under other regulations.  
To comply with acid rain regulations, electric utilities have employed two principal strategies: fuel-
switching and installing emissions scrubber units. Fuel-switching involves substitution away from coals 
containing high amounts of sulfur and toward coals with lower sulfur content and natural gas. Scrubbers 
(also known as flue-gas desulfurization, or FGD, equipment) typically remove about 90% of all sulfur 
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dioxide from a plant’s emissions, allowing it to comply with regulations regardless of the sulfur content 
of the fuel it burns.  
As of 2012 there were 335 scrubber units in operation (US EIA 2014c), with an additional 67 units 
planned, retired, or standby. Figure 2 indicates the dates of installation of FGD units, clearly showing 
their relationship to major Clean Air Act regulatory initiatives in 1977, 1990-1995, and 2010. Scrubbers 
are expensive and highly capital-intensive, and therefore financially risky for their owners, but they are 
politically popular because of their perceived ability to protect high-sulfur mining jobs, as noted by Hoag 
(1995), among others. Lile and Burtraw (1998) document actions taken by state legislatures and 
regulators to encourage scrubber installation following passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. 
In particular, the high-sulfur coal mining states of Tennessee, West Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, 
and Illinois passed laws and crafted regulations designed to allow early and more certain recovery of 
scrubber costs, with the (usually explicit) intent to mitigate the effects of the Acid Rain Program on local 
coal mines. Cicala (2015) provides evidence that coal-fired power plants subject to rate-of-return 
regulation were more likely to install scrubbers than divested plants facing a competitive wholesale 
electric power market. Frey (2013) found that large plants that can take advantage of economies of scale 
are more likely to install scrubbers, but her empirical results confirm that federal and state air quality 
regulations were the most important factor driving the wide adoption of scrubber technology since 1978.  
Figure 2: Fluid Gas Desulfurization (Scrubber) Installation 
 
Source: EIA Form 860 (EIA 2014b) 
Scrubber installation as an alternative to fuel-switching has faced increasing market headwinds over the 
past 30 years. Productivity increases in low-sulfur coal mines, most obviously in the Powder River Basin 
(PRB) of Wyoming, encouraged fuel switching by driving down the price of low-sulfur coal. Carlson et 














burning low-sulfur coals, halved marginal abatement costs from fuel-switching between 1985 and 2000. 
Technological improvements and deregulation in the rail transport system have also favored fuel-
switching over scrubber installation, as documented by Schmalansee and Stavins (2013) and Ellerman 
and Montero (1998), among others. Busse and Keohane (2007) provide evidence that railroads used 
monopoly power to capture some of the rents created from increased PRB coal mining productivity over 
this period. Gerking and Hamilton (2009) provide evidence that railroads are strategic price 
discriminators, implying that, despite railroad monopoly power, PRB coal reaches about as wide a 
geographic area as it would in a fully competitive rail market.  
This literature on fuel-switching in coal-fired power plants has until now focused on the interregional 
substitution of low-sulfur Western coal for Eastern coals of higher sulfur content. But Illinois and 
especially Appalachian coals exhibit considerable intra-regional variation in sulfur content as well, and 
the differential effects of SO2 regulations on these various subregions within the Eastern coalfields is 
much less well studied. Hoag (1995) used state-level data and a simple regression model to examine 
impacts of 1970 and 1977 legislation on Eastern coal production, with some emphasis on the sulfur-
content question. Hoag and Reed (2002) performed time-series regressions on quarterly aggregated 
county-level employment data to find significant negative impacts of the 1977 legislation on coal mining 
in West Kentucky, but not East Kentucky. The current paper contributes to this literature by using county-
level panel data to quantify local variation in coal production associated with air quality policy changes, 
taking into account the sulfur content of coal deposits, the distance between mines and power plants, and 
the use of scrubbers.  
3. Data 
Historical coal mine production data (1983-2012) are available from the Energy Information 
Administration’s coal production database (US EIA 2014a). We collected detailed mine-level data from 
states in the Appalachian (Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, eastern Kentucky, Maryland, Tennessee, 
Georgia) and Illinois (Illinois, Indiana, western Kentucky) basins, creating a 30 year panel for 188 
counties. Because the individual mines in our data set produced for an average of only 4.82 years each, 
we aggregated our data to the county level. Sulfur (percent by weight) and heat content (mmBtu/ton) data 
come from the USGS Coal Quality database, which contains over 13,000 bore-hole samples of coal and 
associated rocks (Bragg et al, 1998). Using ArcGIS Kriging, we interpolated a raster from these borehole 
points. ArcGIS’s ‘Extract Values to Points’ tool produces county-level estimates of average sulfur 
content4. The geographical distribution of sulfur content in the Appalachian and Illinois coalfields is 
                                                     
4  This method presents two main limitations: within-county and between-year variation is missed. For 
example, the average sulfur content a county with two mines will change if one of them closes. However the within-
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shown in figure 3. Higher sulfur content is generally found in coals throughout the Illinois Basin and 
Ohio, along the Ohio River, and to a somewhat lesser extent in parts of Pennsylvania, northern West 
Virginia, Tennessee, and Alabama. To control for differences in the costs of production between counties, 
we use data from FERC form 4235 and EIA Form 923 to construct a relative ratio of average costs 
between each individual county and the Powder River Basin. 
Figure 3: Appalachian and Illinois Basin Coal Sulfur Content 
 
Source: Bragg et al. (1998) 
  
We distinguish four time periods in our analysis: Pre-Regulation6 (1983-1994), Phase 1 (1995-1999), 
Phase 2 (2000-2008), and the ‘Post-2008’ period (2009-2012). The exact timing of these regulations is 
known, however it is less clear when plants began to adjust to them. An examination of the exact timing 
of the regulatory periods is discussed below in section 4.3. Coal prices come from the EIA’s database of 
historical coal prices, displayed in 2005 dollars. We use average bituminous and sub-bituminous coal 
(free-on-board) prices to capture the relative prices between the Eastern and Western coals. Natural gas 
price data come from US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Producer Price Index (PPI), which denotes the price 
of natural gas paid by producers. The PPI is used instead of other natural gas prices such as Henry Hub 
                                                     
county variation in quite small. The average coefficient of variation is below .05 mmBtu, while sample area county 
averages vary between .48-4.63 mmBtu. This suggests that between-year variation, even with a significant number 
of mine closures, is likely low, especially relative to county average distribution.  
5        Collected by the EIA, available: https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia423/ 
6   There were clean-air regulations in place prior to 1995, but these lacked the focus on sulfur 
emissions of the EPA’s Acid Rain Program, Phase I of which began in 1995.  
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because it is a national index of all U.S. regional natural gas prices, it has a longer history than other 
prices, and because it does not need to be deflated. The price of SO2 emissions permits come from the 
annual EPA allowance auction results (US EPA 2014).  
3.1 Megawatt Demand and Geographic Distance 
Demand for coal is influenced by the geographic distance between the purchasing plant and the producing 
mine as well as the capacity of the purchasing plant. Transportation costs increase with distance, so other 
things equal, a plant will demand more coal from nearby mines.  
The EIA (Form 923, Schedule 2) publishes mine-plant contract information (US EIA 2014c), including 
specific tonnage, heat content, ash content, and sulfur content for each contract. In the Illinois and 
Appalachian basins, mines generally have multiple contracts with a single plant, with varying coal 
characteristics. From 2008-2013, 16% of mines sold to only one plant. On average, each mine served 16 
power plants, though the distribution of this variable is highly skewed, and a few mines served more than 
100 plants. About 89% of the Eastern coal mines serving any given plant are located within 350 miles of 
that plant. Prior to 2008, FERC form 423 provides similarly descriptive contract information. 
Each mine faces a demand curve determined by the geographic proximity of coal-fired power plants and 
the demand for electricity production from those plants. We therefore constructed a county-specific coal 
demand variable that takes both power plant capacity and distance into account. We calculated the rail 
distance from every regional coal-fired power plant to every regional coal-producing county. In counties 
where the location of the mines is unknown, we calculated distances from the county’s geographic center. 
In counties where mine location is known, we used a mean-center calculation based on existing mine 
locations within the county.  
In describing demand from an individual power plant, we had the choice of using its energy production 
measured in megawatt-hours (MWh), or potential energy production based on megawatts (MW) of 
nameplate capacity. We chose not to use the former measure because of the endogenous nature of energy 
production. However, a large, new, and efficient plant is more likely to be dispatched than an older, 
smaller, and less efficient one, and hence will demand more coal. We use each boiler’s characteristics to 
generate a predicted capacity factor for each boiler. In our sample time period and area, there were 182 
coal plants, with a total of 517 boilers. A total of 10248 contracts from coal plants within the study area 
are available from FERC Form 423 and EIA Form 923 between 1983 and 2012.  
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Table 1: Capacity Factor Summary Statistics  
 
We regress capacity factor by regressing its capacity factor (MWh produced / nameplate capacity) on its 
age, nameplate capacity, relative price of coal (average bituminous /sub-bituminous price in the given 
year), fuel type, federal NERC region, and binary variables indicating time since a New Source Review 
(NSR):                   
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝑅𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑐𝑖) + 𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
Where: 
CFi,t  = Boiler i’s Capacity Factor at time t 
Ai,t = Boiler i’s Age at time t 
Ci  = Boiler i’s Nameplate Capacity 
NSRi,t = An nx4 matrix indicating whether boiler i had a NSR within 5, 10, 15, and more years at time t 
Nci,t = a nx5 matrix of federal National Energy Regulatory Commission (NERC) regions (time variant as 
in 2006 the geographic boundaries of eastern NERC regions changed) 
CTi,t = the type of coal being burned (bituminous, sub-bituminous, or waste-coal) at boiler i at time t 
RPt = the relative price of bituminous and sub-bituminous coal  
  
Results from this regression are displayed in table 37. Using these coefficients, we generated each boiler’s 
predicted capacity factor from these and each boiler’s specific characteristics in each time period. 
Multiplying this predicted capacity factor by the boiler’s nameplate capacity generates each boiler’s 
‘weighted capacity’.  
                                                     
7 An alternative specification, using policy dummies for policy years rather than individual year dummies produces 
nearly identical results  
Variable N Mean StDev Min Max
CapFac 10248 0.5195285 0.1971746 0.114469 0.9561644
NPC 10248 313.8606 287.2837 0.7 1425.6
Age 10248 46.754 13.09477 1 87
NSR5 10248 0.0070258 0.0835289 0 1
NSR10 10248 0.0040984 0.0638902 0 1
NSR15 10248 0.0039032 0.0623566 0 1
NSRBig 10248 0.0133685 0.1148522 0 1
SERC2005 10248 0.132904 0.3394875 0 1
RFC2005 10248 0.2056987 0.404231 0 1
SERC2004 10248 0.153103 0.3601044 0 1
ECAR2004 10248 0.3393833 0.4735231 0 1
MAAC2004 10248 0.1039227 0.3051752 0 1
MAIN2004 10248 0.0201991 0.1406876 0 1
Bitum 10248 0.850605 0.3564948 0 1
SubBit 10248 0.1258782 0.3317283 0 1
RPxSERC2005 10248 0.5305945 1.358374 0 4.3155
RPxRFC2005 10248 0.8215551 1.618396 0 4.3155
RPxMAAC2004 10248 0.3201805 0.9530813 0 3.802721
RPxMAIN2004 10248 0.0740541 0.5161361 0 3.802721
RPxSERC2004 10248 0.4760105 1.135545 0 3.802721
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We use the weighted capacity to gauge the importance of scrubbers in determining a plant’s demand for 
higher-sulfur coal. Here we developed two separate demand variables, one for scrubbed and a separate 
one for non-scrubbed capacity, using the following equation: 
                                𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑡𝑠 = ∑ 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑠/𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1    (2) 
The weighted capacity generated from each boiler in county j divided by its Raildistance, the distance 
between generation unit and mine county along existing rail networks8. These are summed for each 
county. We do this twice: One for all boilers, and the other for only boilers that have scrubbers installed, 
creating Total and Scrubbered MW Demand variables.  
In a regression on county coal production, the expected sign of a county’s MW Demand coefficient is 
positive: both increasing capacity and decreasing transport distance should increase the marketability of 
the produced coal. Table 2 displays summary statistics for variables used in the estimation. 
Table 2: Capacity Factor Regression Results 
 
4. Empirical Model 
With mine production aggregated to the county level, 18% of the county-years in this study had no 
production. Because the decision to produce and the quantity of production are related, we employ a two-
stage Heckman sample selection model. Summary statistics are displayed in table 3.  
                                                     
8 Calculated using ArcGIS 
Independent Variables Yearly Fixed Effects Independent Variables Yearly Fixed Effects
NamePlateCap 0.000165*** MAAC2004 -0.252**
(7.08e-06) (0.123)
Age -0.000630*** MAIN2004 -0.337**
(0.000161) (0.134)
NSR5 0.0732*** Bitum -0.225***
(0.0207) (0.0124)
NSR10 0.0333 Sub-Bitum -0.168***
(0.0269) (0.0133)
NSR15 -0.134*** RPxSERC2005 0.0140***
(0.0277) (0.00250)
NSRBig -0.125*** RPxRFC2005 0.0118***
(0.0156) (0.00238)
SERC2005 -0.00546 RPxMAAC2004 -0.0111***
(0.0234) (0.00190)
RFC2005 -0.0896*** RPxMAIN2004 -0.00947*
(0.0223) (0.00571)
SERC2004 -0.341*** RPxSERC2004 0.00901***
(0.123) (0.00161)
ECAR2004 -0.326*** Constant 0.890***
(0.122) (0.0759)
Dependent Variable: Boiler Capaciticy Factor
Standard errors in parentheses









Table 3: Full Model Summary Statistics 
 
4.1 First Stage Probit 
The first stage of the Heckman selection model uses a probit regression to estimate the probability 𝑝𝑖𝑡 that 
a county’s coal mines produce in a given year. The probit regressors include the county’s sulfur content 
interacted with the policy time period, total MW/distance for both scrubbed and non-scrubbed plants, and 
total PRB production. Because natural gas can be used as a substitute for coal in electricity production, 
the relative price ratio of natural gas to the yearly average of national bituminous coal prices is also 
included.  
Table 4: First Stage Probit Results 
 
Results shown in Table 3 indicate strong relationship between the probability of mine shutdowns and 
sulfur content. To illustrate, if all other variables are held at mean levels, a one standard deviation 
increase of sulfur content reduces the probability of producing in the Post-2008 period by an estimated 
Variable N Mean StDev Min Max
Total Coal Production (short Tons) 5640 2736747 4824727 0 4.27E+07
ln(Total Coal Production) 4610 13.6961 2.069643 3.401197 17.56971
ARP Phase I 5640 0.1666667 0.372711 0 1
ARP Phase II 5640 0.3 0.4582982 0 1
Post 2008 5640 0.1333333 0.3399648 0 1
Sulfur Content 5640 1.7765 0.9172763 0.4781538 4.628617
Total MWD 5640 379.2342 134.8486 0 934.1699
Scrubbered MWD 5640 92.80156 63.59492 0 534.7488
Relative Production Costs 5640 1.182559 0.3841866 0.3692269 4.40113
Total PRB Production 30 315.7501 120.8213 122.4655 495.9642
ln(Total PRB Production) 30 5.669785 0.4294673 4.807829 6.206504
Natural Gas / Coal Price 30 5.596567 3.625301 2.233773 14.21612
Independent Variables Probit Independent Variables Probit
ARP Phase I -0.111 Scrub MWD 0.00384***
(0.220) (0.00116)
ARP Phase II 0.393 Total MWD 4.52e-05
(0.273) (0.000861)
Post 2008 0.825** Natural Gas / Coal Price 0.0328
(0.323) (0.0371)
SO2 x Phase I -0.270*** ln(Total PRB Production) 0.000641
(0.104) (0.00196)
SO2 x Phase II -0.567*** SO2 Content 0.277
(0.0936) (0.172)
SO2 x Post 2008 -0.612*** Year -0.0832***
(0.112) (0.0262)
Relative Production Costs -0.263** Constant 167.6***
(0.106) (51.87)





Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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14%. The negative and significant coefficient on PRB production is consistent with fuel-switching from 
Eastern to Western coals. The significant and positive coefficient on the scrubbed MW Demand variable 
indicates that scrubbers in coal plant boilers may have reduced the incidence of mine closures, as was 
intended by the state legislators and regulators who formulated policies to encourage scrubber installation. 
4.2 Estimation of Coal Demand 
In the second stage of the Heckman selection model, we regressed the log of coal production in county 𝑖 
and year 𝑡 on policy variables, our measure of distance-attenuated megawatt demand, price, and the 
inverse Mills ratio generated from the probit estimation. These relationships are modeled as: 
 ln (𝑦𝑖𝑡) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑃1𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑃2𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑃𝐶𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃1𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃2𝑡) +
𝛽6(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑡) +  𝛽7(𝑇𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃1𝑡) + 𝛽9(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃2𝑡) +
𝛽10(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑡) + 𝛽11(ln (𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐵𝑡)) + 𝛽12(𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽13(𝑅𝑃𝑟𝑡) + 𝛽14(𝑌𝑟𝑡) +




𝑦𝑖𝑡     Logged production in tons of mine county i in year t  
𝑆𝐶𝑖    Sulfur content (lbs/mmBtu) at mine county i  
𝑃1𝑡    Binary variable, 1 when ARP Phase 1 was in place (1995-1999), zero otherwise 
𝑃2𝑡     Binary variable, 1 when ARP Phase 2 was in place (2000-2008), zero otherwise 
𝑃𝐶𝑡   Binary variable, 1 after the 2008 US Circuit Court ruling (2009-2012), zero otherwise 
𝑇𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡   Total MW Demand in year t / Miles from mine county i 
𝑆𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡            Total FGD-installed MW Demand in year t / Miles from mine county i 
ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑃𝑅𝐵𝑡)    Logged total PRB coal production  
𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡    Relative production costs between county i and the PRB in year t 
𝑅𝑃𝑟𝑡    Natural gas/coal price ratio in year t 
𝑌𝑟𝑡           Yearly trend  
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡  Inverse Mills Ratio for county i in year t 
Regression results reported in table 4 show statistically significant relationships of the expected signs 
between coal production and all but one of the explanatory variables.9 The coefficient on Powder River 
Basin production is both negative and significant, indicating a nearly one-for-one substitution of PRB 
production for study-area coal production. The inverse Mills ratio coefficient is positive and significant, 
indicating the expected positive relationship between mine activity and output. Perhaps surprisingly, the 
addition of county-level fixed effects causes very little change in coefficients of any variables except 
distance-adjusted MW Demand. This result suggests that our MW-Demand variable is effective in 
capturing relevant county-specific effects. The lack of significance of the MW-Demand variable in the 
                                                     
9  An alternative specification using a Tobit model produced qualitatively similar results 
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fixed-effects results may simply reflect the tendency for power plants to be located near the coalfields, a 
tendency that is largely captured by the county fixed effects.  




Although the three policy period binary variables have positive and significant coefficients, interacting 
sulfur content with the policy variables yields negative and significant coefficients, so the estimated net 
effect of sulfur regulations on coal production was negative for most counties for most regulatory time 
periods, as shown in figure 4. Colors in figure 4 correspond to the value 𝛽1(𝑃1𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑃2𝑡) +
 𝛽3(𝑃𝐶𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃1𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃2𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑡), a log difference expressed as a percentage. 
Independent Variables County Fixed Effects Random Effects
ARP Phase I 0.0816 0.109
(0.127) (0.128)
ARP Phase II 0.444*** 0.504***
(0.157) (0.156)
Post 2008 0.198 0.327
(0.218) (0.213)
SO2 x Phase I -0.442*** -0.441***
(0.100) (0.101)
SO2 x Phase II -0.544*** -0.577***
(0.0986) (0.0978)
SO2 x Post 2008 -0.304** -0.347**
(0.154) (0.152)
Total MWD 0.00116 0.00256***
(0.000868) (0.000626)
SO2 x Phase I x ScrubMWD 0.00289*** 0.00279***
(0.000552) (0.000557)
SO2 x Phase II x ScrubMWD 0.00203*** 0.00213***
(0.000391) (0.000389)
SO2 x Post 2008 x ScrubMWD 0.000832* 0.00105**
(0.000475) (0.000456)
ln(Total PRB Production) -1.390*** -1.715***
(0.415) (0.388)
Relative Production Costs -0.434*** -0.395***
(0.0774) (0.0766)









Number of fips 188 188
R-squared 0.088 0.087
Dependent Variable: ln(Total Coal Production)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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This number may be interpreted as a “pure sulfur regulation effect,” net of the effects of both scrubber 
installation and Powder River Basin coal production. In Phase 1 (P1=1, P2=PC=0), all 188 coal-
producing counties show an estimated decrease in coal production associated with the policy change. The 
estimated effect on coal production is negative in Phase 2 (P2=1, P1=PC=0) for the 168 counties (89%) 
whose coals contain at least 0.78 lbs/mmBtu of sulfur; in the Post-2008 period (PC=1) the 176 counties 
(94%) whose coals contain more than 0.67 lbs/mmBtu are estimated to have lost production as a 
consequence of the regulations. The biggest “losers” from regulations in each case are concentrated along 
the Ohio River and in the Illinois Basin, while the “winners” are in southeastern West Virginia, western 
Virginia, and eastern Pennsylvania.  
 
Figure 4:  Estimated Effects of Clean Air Act Policy on Coal Production 
 
The installation of scrubbers in coal plants is also associated with increases in high-sulfur coal production, 
as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction variable of scrubbed capacity, 
regulatory regime, and sulfur content. Thus, the higher the sulfur content in a county’s coals, the larger 
the effect of scrubbed capacity on coal production, and the more scrubbed capacity in a mine’s 
neighborhood, the greater the marginal ameliorative effect on its high-sulfur coal production loss. The 
magnitude of the scrubber effect is largest in Phase 1, when only the highest emitters were regulated and 
the technology of fuel-switching was less well-developed. The geographic impact of scrubbers is 
illustrated in figure 5, in which the shading indicates the value 𝛽8(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑐𝑏𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃1𝑡) for Phase I, 
𝛽9(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑐𝑏𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃2𝑡) for Phase II, and 𝛽10(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑐𝑏𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑡) for the Post-2008 era, with the 
log difference expressed as a percentage. Effects are large, and are near 100% in the Ohio River Valley, 




Figure 5:  Estimated Percentage Increase of Coal Production Due to Scrubbers 
 
Figure 6 combines the two effects shown in figures 4 and 5, and colors correspond to values of 
𝛽1(𝑃1𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑃2𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑃𝐶𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃1𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃2𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑡) +  𝛽7(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡) +
𝛽8(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑐𝑏𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃1𝑡) + 𝛽9(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑐𝑏𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃2𝑡) + 𝛽10(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑐𝑏𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑡), again 
expressed as a percentage change. Overall, compared to the “pure sulfur effects” shown in figure 4, the 
introduction of scrubbers increases production in all counties, particularly for Phase 1, and for counties in 
Ohio, western Kentucky, and Alabama. These effects are less pronounced for of regulation.  
Figure 6:  Estimated Overall Effects of CAA Policy and Scrubbers on Coal Production 
 
 
4.3 Regulation Year Specification  
Our assignment of policy years aligns with when the given policies were enacted, but knowledge of these 
policies was widespread prior to their implementation. While it is possible that some plants adjusted to 
the new policy regimes immediately upon their implementation, it is likely that some began their 
mitigating strategies, buying emissions permits, changing fuel sources or installing scrubber units on 
boilers, before the regulation was in place. Given the uncertainty that was present surrounding the 
development and modifications of the ARP, this seems likely even if it cost the plant more in the short-
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run. If this is the case, then the assignment of policy years directly on their implementation would not 
capture the entirety of the policy period’s effect. We therefore test this effect by changing the years 
associated with each policy period forwards and backwards three years each10. Results are qualitatively 
similar for lagged models (moving the starting date back), however the original model produces the 
lowest AIC and BIC values. Similarly we modify just the initial policy period’s timing, and find the most 
preferable model starting in 1995.  
We also test the model for the existence of a prior trend in our dependent variable. An omitted variable 
causing the parameter to change could potentially create problems of the identification of our policy 
variables. We estimate the model in equation (3) with all cross-sectionally invariant variables removed 
but year and sulfur-year interaction variables (SO2*year) added. A graph of the added coefficients and 
their 95% confidence intervals are displayed in figure 7: the yellow line represents the path of Eastern 
lower-sulfur coal relative to the baseline (1983), and the blue line represents the year-sulfur interaction 
terms. These can be interpreted as the deviation of higher-sulfur coal from the path of lower-sulfur coal, 
again relative to the base year. The influence of PRB is clearly shown in the yellow line, where the 
sharpest decreases occur in years where the PRB have the largest increases. The interacted year and SO2 
variables are never significantly different relative to 1983 levels. Together, these suggest that no prior 
trend was present in the market that would potentially drive results other than the policy changes.  
Figure 7: Year and Year*SO2 Coefficients, with 95% Confidence Intervals 
 
 
5. Sulfur Price Elasticity 
We also examine the relationship between allowance permit pricing and coal production. Twenty years’ 
worth of allowance trading data (1993-2012) are available; however, we examine effects only in the years 
                                                     









1993-2008, as allowance availability became a non-binding constraint on power plant operations after 
2008. To measure the sulfur price elasticity of coal production, we regress logged production values on 
allowance prices and relevant policy and other control variables, including county fixed effects.  
 
 ln (𝑦𝑖𝑡) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(ln (𝐴𝑃𝑡)) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ ln (𝐴𝑃𝑡)) + 𝛽3(𝑃1𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑃2𝑡) +
 𝛽5(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃1𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃2𝑡) + 𝛽7(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑐𝑏𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃1𝑡) +
𝛽9(𝑆𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑐𝑏𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃2𝑡) + β10(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡) + β11(ln (𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐵𝑡)) + 𝛽12(𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽13(𝑅𝑃𝑟𝑡) + 𝛽14(𝑌𝑟𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡   
(4) 
 
where  𝐴𝑃𝑡 is the Sulfur Allowance Price in year t and other variables are as defined above. 
Fixed-effects regression results are presented in table 5, along with pooled-OLS results for comparison. 
During the modeled years of sulfur permit trading (1993-2008), the elasticity should depend on the sulfur 
content of the county’s coals. The allowance price coefficient 1 may be interpreted as the sulfur 
allowance price elasticity of production for coals with zero sulfur content. Its positive coefficient suggests 
that allowances and low-sulfur coal are substitutes. The estimated coefficient 2 is negative for the 
interaction-term between sulfur content and allowance price, indicating that the elasticity of substitution 
between low-sulfur coal and allowance permits declines with increasing sulfur content; that is, that coal 
sulfur content and SO2 allowance permits are complements. Using results from the county-level fixed 
effects model, the overall allowance-price elasticity of coal production is negative for the 90 of 188 (47%) 
counties whose coals contain more than 1.5 lb/mmBtu of sulfur. Within our data set, the allowance price 




Table 6: Sulfur Elasticity Regression Results 
 
This relatively high sulfur threshold requirement for complementarity is perhaps surprising. However, 
much of the discussion of the Acid Rain Program in the literature (see especially Bohi and Burtraw, 1996, 
and Schmalensee and Stavins 2013) emphasizes that the sulfur allowance market was affected by many 
factors that tended to divorce it from contemporaneous coal production. Many allowances were purchased 
and banked for later use, and the price spike of 2006 was largely attributed to disruptions in rail transport 
from the PRB region, which would have increased the demand for Eastern coal of all types.  
6. Conclusions 
It is difficult to disentangle the effects of clean air policy from the effects of technological change and 
market competition, but doing so is of great importance for policy evaluation. Effective environmental 
regulation will usually be destructive to polluting industries. The perception of regulatory effectiveness 
matters for determining the political environment in which regulatory policy is made, because an effective 
Independent Variables County Fixed Effects Pooled OLS
ln(Sulfur Allowance Price) 0.0497 0.0653
(0.0444) (0.0438)
SO2 x ln(Sulfur Allowance Price) -0.0329* -0.0417**
(0.0173) (0.0166)
ARP Phase I 0.231 0.209
(0.162) (0.164)
ARP Phase II 0.204 0.154
(0.192) (0.193)
SO2 x Phase I -0.348*** -0.317***
(0.116) (0.116)
SO2 x Phase II -0.259*** -0.235**
(0.0949) (0.0953)
Total MWD 0.00317** 0.00439***
(0.00124) (0.000872)
SO2 x Phase I x ScrubMWD 0.00214*** 0.00190***
(0.000640) (0.000629)
SO2 x Phase II x ScrubMWD 0.00126*** 0.00118***
(0.000398) (0.000398)
ln(Total PRB Production) -2.045*** -2.185***
(0.769) (0.757)
Relative Production Costs -0.291*** -0.248***
(0.0741) (0.0737)







Number of FIPS 188 188
Dependent Variable: ln(County Production)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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regulation is worth fighting about, both for those concerned with environmental quality and for those 
whose livelihood depends on the polluting industries. If we believe that market forces rather than 
environmental regulation will determine the future state of the environment then we have little incentive 
to maintain the current regulatory structure.  
In this paper, we have presented evidence of the effectiveness of environmental regulation in changing 
patterns of production in the Eastern coal industry, an industry that produces a product that is undoubtedly 
both useful and environmentally harmful. We use a fixed-effects model that corrects for sample 
selectivity bias on county-level panel data for the period 1983-2012. We control for market forces in the 
form of natural gas prices11, PRB coal production, and relative production costs. Taking advantage of 
cross-sectional variation in sulfur content within Eastern coalfields and variation in mine proximity to 
coal-fired power plants, we quantify various aspects of the negative relationship between the sulfur 
content of Eastern coals and their production during each of the three phases of sulfur dioxide regulation.  
We find evidence that, after controlling for broad scale market forces, coal production in all counties in 
the Appalachian and Illinois basins was harmed during Phase 1 of the EPA’s Acid Rain Program, though 
as many as 14% of the counties may have seen an increase in production as a result of later phases of 
regulation. In a separate regression, we find that (from 1995 to 2008) increases in allowance prices were 
associated with reduced production for about 51% of the highest-sulfur coals, but are associated with 
positive or zero effects for the remainder. We also find strong evidence that installing flue gas scrubbers 
in power plants effectively encourages production from high-sulfur mines, as was the intent of coal-state 
regulators and legislators who implemented policies designed to encourage their installation.  
The study has limitations. We make no serious attempt to estimate the causal effect of PRB coal 
production on Eastern coal production, as our PRB production variable is highly trended and is therefore 
collinear with other trended variables, such as technological change and economic growth. Although our 
study takes into account the spatial structure of county-level coal markets, more sophisticated modeling 
methods might be employed. We also make no attempt to explore the local employment or income effects 
of the estimated changes in production, leaving such considerations to a future study.  
Despite these limitations, these results fill a gap in the policy literature. While many previous studies have 
alluded to changes in coal production associated with Clean Air Act regulations, this is the first, and the 
most fine-grained, study attempting to quantify these effects on coal production after controlling for 
market forces. We are entering an era in which new market forces, most obviously the increase in shale 
gas and oil production, and new regulations related to climate change are reshaping the energy industries 
                                                     
11 Which we find have little or no effect during our period of study. One possible explanation is that the rapid 
decrease of natural gas prices only began at the end of our sample period 
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of North America and the world. A continuing effort is needed to improve our understanding of the 
effects of those regulations and market forces, for good and ill, on industrial structure and personal well-
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Chapter 3 - Essay #2: Turbulent Times: Uncovering the Origins of US Natural Gas Price 








































Abstract: In this paper, we investigate supply and demand shocks in the US natural gas market, focusing 
on how the effects of these shocks have changed over time. We apply a sign-identified structural vector 
autoregression (SVAR) model that allows for both time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility. 
Using quarterly data from 1976 to 2015, we model how the price elasticities of supply and demand have 
changed, finding that both supply associated with aggregate demand and demand have become more 
elastic since the shale boom. Further, we find the price of natural gas has become more (less) responsive 
to aggregate demand (supply) shocks since the sharp decrease in prices. And finally, we evaluate three 
historical price episodes and estimate the role played by each variable. This comprehensive analysis will 





Natural gas is a critical component of the energy industry in the US. The Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) estimated that in 2014, approximately 26.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas was 
consumed in the US, supplying roughly 27% of electricity generation and 19% of all residential heating12. 
In commercial manufacturing, natural gas is widely used as both a primary fuel source and raw material. 
At the macro-scale, the domestic natural gas industry is closely tied to economic development, 
employment, and industrial output, and its growth is often considered as contributing to US energy 
independence. In his 2013 State of the Unions speech, President Obama claimed that the domestic 
production of natural gas “has led to cleaner power and greater energy independence”. As the burning of 
natural gas emits fewer greenhouse gas emissions relative to coal, the following year he highlighted 
natural gas as the “bridge” fuel that can transition the US economy from its traditional reliance on fossil 
fuels.  
However, little is known about the price fluctuations in the US natural gas market and their specific 
causes. As figure 1 demonstrates, natural gas prices in the US have experienced significant volatility over 
the past three decades. Behind these price fluctuations are fundamental structural changes in the natural 
gas market driven mainly by exogenous supply and demand shocks. In the aftermath of the supply 
disruptions caused by hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, natural gas prices hit a record high in both 
nominal and real terms, followed by a more than 50% drop as weather conditions unexpectedly 
improved13. Then during the financial crisis of 2008, natural gas prices experienced significant shifts, a 
pattern shared by many other commodities. Most recently, domestic production from shale and other 
lower-permeability formations has become economically profitable, sparked by the popularization of the 
combined use of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing techniques. These new techniques have 
completely revolutionized the market. In 2007 shale production roughly 10% of US dry natural gas 
production, while in 2014 it increased to over 53%14. Despite these enormous changes, studies of the 
driving forces behind natural gas price movements still lag behind those from other energy markets. 
  
                                                     
12 See EIA natural gas consumption data at: https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_cons_sum_dcu_nus_a.htm  
13 See EIA price data at: https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm  
14 See shale gas production data at: https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_shalegas_s1_a.htm 
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Figure 1. Natural Gas Producer Price Index in the US and Its One-Year CVs (1975-2015) 
 
The purpose of this paper is to disentangle supply and demand shocks in the US natural gas market and 
investigate how the effects of these shocks have changed over time. Using a sign-identified structural 
vector autoregression (SVAR) model that allows for both time-varying parameters and stochastic 
volatility (Baumeister and Peersman, 2013a, b), we estimate the time-varying effects of these shocks on 
the evolution of US natural gas prices, calculate price elasticities due to shifts in the supply or associated 
demand curve, and evaluate their relative importance on price variations during historical episodes 
characterized by large price fluctuations.   
Overall, estimation results suggest that the impacts of different structural shocks have evolved 
considerably since markets were formally deregulated in 1993. We find that an unanticipated supply 
decrease raises natural gas prices, reduces the aggregate demand, and lowers inventory demand. 
Unanticipated decreases in aggregate demand, on the other hand, depress prices, reduce production, and 
encourage inventory demand. We find that both the price elasticities of supply and demand have 
increased in magnitudes in recent years, possibly reflecting the greater flexibility in production and in fuel 
switching due to technological advances. Though precautionary inventory demand is shown to have a 
greater impact over time, its magnitude remains small. The main drivers of natural gas price movements 
appear to be the supply and aggregate demand shocks. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews relevant literature on 
estimating the supply and demand structure in the natural gas market. Section three describes the 
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econometric procedure used in the analysis, and section four presents the data used in this analysis. In 
section five, we report the estimation results from a time-varying structural VAR model that allows for 
stochastic volatility. In section six, we investigate a few historical episodes and estimate the relative role 
of supply and demand in these events, and section six concludes the paper. 
2. Brief Literature Review 
Only a handful of studies have attempted to understand the supply-and-demand structure in the US 
natural gas market, with the majority focusing on the spatial pricing efficiency in regional gas markets 
and natural gas’ price relationship with other energy commodities. For instance, Mohammadi (2011) 
demonstrates that while prices of oil and coal are determined globally and by long term contracts 
respectively, natural gas prices are determined regionally. Olsen et al. (2015) find cointegration between 
North American natural gas markets, though the degree of integration varies depending on location. 
Siliverstovs et al. (2005) find integration of natural gas prices within European and US markets, but not 
between. Similar results are found in Renou-Maissant (2012) and Park et al. (2007), among others. The 
pricing relationship between natural gas and crude oil and other energy commodities has as well received 
much attention from the literature, as for many applications, natural gas and refined petroleum products 
are close substitutes. Though fuel switching may be limited in the short-run due to technological 
constraints, researchers overall agree that (1) natural gas and crude oil prices were strongly linked before 
2008, and (2) natural gas prices tend to be more influenced by oil prices, rather than the other way around 
(e.g. Atil et al. (2014), Brigida (2014), Brown and Yücel (2008), Hartley and Medlock (2014), Ji et al. 
(2014), and  Ramberg and Parsons (2012)).  
A core problem in the natural gas market is understanding how natural gas prices respond to different 
market shocks and the relative importance of each shock in driving price movements. Recently, Nick and 
Thoenes (2014) analyze the German natural gas market, and the impact that three significant supply 
shocks have had on prices using a structural VAR model. They argue that in the short-run temperature, 
storage, and supply shortfalls play an important role. Woo et al. (2014) find that end-use prices of natural 
gas generally reflect cost of wholesale, with only a small time-period of adjustment. Mu (2007) highlights 
the importance of weather on natural gas prices. Hulshof et al. (2016) conclude that the day-ahead gas 
prices at the Dutch gas hub are predominantly determined by gas-market fundamentals. Brown and Yücel 
(2008), by contrast, argue that after accounting for weather, inventories, and supply disruptions, oil price 
fluctuations remain the primary determinants of natural gas prices.  
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Given that the market for natural gas has undergone significant changes over the past decades, studies 
have also attempted to include structural breaks when modeling natural gas prices. Qin et al. (2010) find 
that the importance of fundamentals change depending on market regime, playing a larger role in bullish 
than in bearish markets. They further contend that natural gas price behavior is far more complicated than 
that predicted by fundamentals, and that volatility unexplained by fundamentals plays an essential role in 
natural gas price behavior. Several studies have also incorporated the impact of shale boom in shaping 
natural gas prices. Arora (2014) uses a structural VAR to estimate the supply and demand elasticity of US 
natural gas prices prior to and after the shale boom. He finds that both the short- and long-run natural gas 
supply becomes more elastic when the effects of a shale development are included, while the demand 
becomes either less responsive or similar to price changes after accounting for shale production (post-
2007). Wakamatsu and Aruga (2013) model the US and Japanese natural gas markets using a one-time 
structural break from the shale boom, finding that the two markets used to be interlinked before the 
revolution, but the US market has become more independent after the revolution.15 
Our analysis is closely related to this last stream of literature, focusing on the time-variation and structural 
breaks in the natural gas supply and demand dynamics. This work is of particular importance given the 
increasingly volatile natural gas market that has witnessed significant changes in the market structure over 
the past two decades. The studies of Wakamatsu and Aruga (2013) and Arora (2014) both impose a one-
time structural break to account for the shale gas boom. However, a more comprehensive structure is 
needed to account for other exogenous shocks that have significantly influenced the natural gas markets. 
Additionally, as suggested by Primiceri (2005), imposing discrete structural breaks may be inappropriate 
as aggregation in the private sector can smooth such changes.  
Our work contributes to the growing literature on the natural gas markets in a number of ways. First, we 
construct a comprehensive framework that enables a thorough investigation of the role of supply 
disruptions, aggregate demand shocks, and speculative inventory shocks on natural gas prices in the US. 
Second, recognizing both that massive changes have occurred in the natural gas market and that these 
changes are likely to evolve gradually over time, we consider a time-varying structural VAR model that 
allows for smooth, continuously-evolving parameters (Baumeister and Peersman, 2013a, b). The 
estimation procedure enables us to estimate the dynamic effects of various structural shocks on the 
evolution of natural gas prices. Third, given the apparent changes in natural gas price volatility (figure 1), 
we explicitly consider residual heteroscedasticity in the VAR model that accounts for both changes in the 
magnitude of structural shocks and their immediate impacts. Such heteroscedasticity, if overlooked, may 
                                                     
15 In a slightly different vein, Arora and Lieskovsky (2014) find that the shale gas revolution has made the natural gas industry 
more relevant to the US economic activity by estimating a structural VAR model accounting for different timeframes. 
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generate spurious inference from the estimated coefficients (Cogley and Sargent, 2005). Finally, unlike 
previous structural VAR models that often rely on a contemporaneous exclusion or recursive 
identification strategy, we use sign-restrictions directly implied from economic theory to recover 
structural shocks. The resulting impulse responses, forecast error variance decompositions, historical 
decompositions, and elasticity estimates complement the existing literature on modeling the supply and 
demand structure in the US natural gas market. 
3. Methodology 
Consider the following reduced-form vector autoregression (VAR) model with a lag length of 𝑝: 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵1,𝑡 𝑦𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝐵𝑝,𝑡 𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑒𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡
′
𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 , (1) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is a [4 × 1] vector of endogenous variables consisting of  the total physical availability of 
natural gas in the US (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡), aggregate real economic activity (𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡), the precautionary inventory 
demand (𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑡), and the real price of natural gas (𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑡). The right-hand side of equation (1) can be 
simplified as 𝑋𝑡
′
𝑡 + 𝑡, where 𝑡 consists coefficients on the lags of the endogenous variables  
𝐵1,𝑡 , … 𝐵𝑝,𝑡, each of which is a [4 × 4] matrix. The reduced-form residuals 𝑒𝑡 can be written as weighted 
averages of the structural errors 𝑢𝑡, which are commonly assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed (iid). Following Kilian (2009); Kilian and Murphy (2012); Arora (2014); Arora and 
Lieskovsky (2014); Kilian and Murphy (2014), we define our four structural shocks as shocks in supply, 
aggregate demand, speculative inventory demand, and residual demand. The relationship between 
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where 𝑎11, 𝑎12, … 𝑎44 refer to contemporaneous relations between endogenous variables. A supply shock 
refers to unexpected supply disruptions in the natural gas market that displace the supply curve due to 
technology, weather or policy changes. An economic activity shock incorporates unexpected demand 
shocks driven by changes in real economic activity in the US not already reflected in supply shocks. 
Though Kilian (2009) and a number of following papers use an aggregate economic index based on dry 
cargo shipping rates to represent oil demand shocks driven by global real economic activity, we prefer a 
regional economic activity measure for the natural gas market. Previous studies have found that unlike oil 
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prices which are determined in the global market, natural gas is a regional commodity influenced 
primarily by region-specific demand and supply conditions (e.g. Mohammadi, 2011). The third shock, to 
which we refer to as speculative inventory demand shock, includes shifts in the demand for natural gas 
inventories not otherwise explained by supply or aggregate demand shocks. If market participants are 
forward-looking and rational, then speculative inventory demand increases if net prices of natural gas 
(excluding cost of carry) are expected to increase. Kilian and Murphy (2014) argue that the speculative 
demand shock reflects changes in inventory behavior due to rational market participants reacting to news 
about future supply or demand conditions. It should be noted that our definition of speculative activity is 
rather broad – it includes any inventory accumulating (reducing) behavior in anticipation of future supply 
shortfalls (increases) relative to market demand. Finally, the residual shock refers to innovations in 
natural gas demand not otherwise accounted for by the three previous shocks.  Examples of such residual 
demand shocks include changes in inventory technology or preferences, residential consumers’ 
preferences changes, changes in consumption pattern due to population shift toward warmer regions, new 
pipelines, opening import/export markets, increased electricity generation, etc. Similar VAR 
specifications have been used in various previous studies to disentangle structural shocks in the crude oil 
and natural gas markets, including Arora (2014), Arora and Lieskovsky (2014), Baumeister and Peersman 
(2013a), Kilian (2009), and Kilian and Murphy (2014) among others.16 
While equation (1) can be consistently estimated using standard econometric procedures, restrictions need 
to be placed on the contemporaneous coefficient matrix (equation 2) to recover the structural innovations 
𝑢𝑡. Previous studies using a structural VAR approach have often imposed a recursive structure of the 
endogenous variables in the system in which the preceding variable affects the following variable at 
contemporaneous time, but not vice-versa. Implicit in this approach is the assumption that the very short-
run aggregate demand or supply elasticity equals zero so that the correlations between the error in 
forecasting quantity and price changes in the next period could be interpreted as the response of aggregate 
supply or demand to the structural shock (Hamilton, 2015) 
Four problems exist with such recursively-identified SVAR models. First, previous studies have often 
assumed that parameters in an SVAR model remain constant throughout the sample period. As argued 
earlier, this assumption is unlikely to hold, especially since 1993. Second, even for studies that allow for 
time-varying parameters, the conventional approach has been to impose a one-time or multiple abrupt 
                                                     
16 Previous studies on natural gas market also consider the impact of weather conditions on price fluctuations. Since our model is 
estimated on a quarterly basis, short-term weather impacts are likely to be small. In the empirical part, we also deseasonalize our 
data using quarterly dummies, further removing the seasonality in demand and inventory due to weather variations. Finally, even 
if weather does play a significant role in the deseasonalized quarterly data, it should show up in the residual demand shocks from 
residential heating demand. 
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structural breaks in the data. While such discrete break models may describe the occurrence of 
unexpected, rapid policy changes in the market, rarely do commodity markets evolve in an abrupt fashion 
such that the impacts of structural shocks differ dramatically prior to and after the break. In particular, the 
discrete break model cannot capture changes brought about by the private sector where heterogeneous 
agents respond to external shocks in a diverse fashion. Aggregation of these heterogeneous behaviors are 
likely to smooth out the economic impacts of discrete policy changes (Primiceri, 2005). Additionally, if 
economic agents are rational and forward-looking, the expected policy changes are likely to be 
incorporated into business forecasting long before the change actually takes place. The learning dynamics 
of the private sector imply that models only allow for discrete structural breaks are unable to capture how 
modifications occur in the market transmission mechanism.  
 A third problem with previous studies is that the error terms in the VAR models are often assumed to be 
identically distributed (homeoskedastisitic) over time, an assumption that rarely holds in practice. As 
figure 1 illustrates, natural gas prices have undergone considerable volatility over the past decades. Such 
heteroscedasticity in the underlying data, if overlooked, may generate fictions dynamics in the 
coefficients of the model (Cogley and Sargent, 2005). Finally, in a recursively-identified SVAR, 
structural shocks (𝑢𝑡) are recovered by orthogonalizing the reduced-form errors (𝑒𝑡) through a Cholesky 
decomposition. This approach relies on the assumption that the relationship between endogenous 
variables follows a particular casual chain such that the preceding variable affects the following variable 
at contemporaneous time, but not the other way around. This assumption is less appropriate when dealing 
with data of low frequency (e.g. quarterly). Additionally, unless there is a convincing theoretical rationale 
for a particular ordering, the resulting analyses for the structural VAR model (e.g. impulse responses, 
variance decompositions, etc.) are not credible. This problem cannot be alleviated by considering 
alternative orderings, as restrictions on structural parameters should follow economic rationales rather 
than sensitivity analysis (Kilian, 2013).  
3.1 Precautionary Demand 
Like many storable commodities, the storable nature of natural gas forces inventories to play a pivotal 
role in the market dynamics. Along with mitigating the seasonal variation in both production and 
consumption, the level of inventory available partly reflects how quickly firms can respond to unexpected 
demand or supply shocks. The theory of storage (e.g., Kaldor, 1939; Working, 1948, 1949; Brennan, 
1958) states that firms earn a convenience yield by holding inventory at hand, which prevents disruptions 
in the flow of goods and services, and in turn reduces production uncertainty. A number of studies have 
investigated the relationship between prices and inventories (e.g., Wright and Williams, 1991; Miranda 
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and Fackler, 2004), finding that inventories not only help absorb price fluctuations, but also reflect the 
degree to which forward-looking inventory holders expect price to rise or fall in a future period. 
Accordingly, the demand for inventory in the natural gas market may be interpreted a speculative 
demand, as speculators have the ability to put more (less) into storage in anticipation of a substantial rise 
(fall) in future prices.17 
3.2 A Time-Varying Parameter VAR Model with Stochastic Volatility 
Baumeister and Peersman (2013a, 2013b) suggest a VAR model with time-varying parameters and 
stochastic volatility to resolve the first three problems. Specifically, instead of assuming constant 
parameters or abrupt discrete changes in parameters over the sample period, they let the coefficient 
matrices 𝐵1,𝑡 , …𝐵𝑝,𝑡  in equation (1) to vary in time, or equivalently, 𝑡 to be time-varying. Further, the 
disturbance term 𝑒𝑡 is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and a time-varying covariance 
matrix Ω𝑡: 
 Ω𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡
−1𝐻𝑡(𝐴𝑡
−1)′, (3) 
where 𝐴𝑡  is a 4 × 4  lower triangular matrix that models the contemporaneous correlations among the 
four endogenous variables and  𝐻𝑡 is a  4 × 4 diagonal matrix that models the stochastic volatility in the 
residuals. The specific representations of 𝐴𝑡 and 𝐻𝑡 are shown in equation (4): 
 
𝐴𝑡 = [
1 0 0 0
𝛼21,𝑡 1 0 0
𝛼31,𝑡 𝛼32,𝑡 1 0
𝛼41,𝑡 𝛼42,𝑡 𝛼43,𝑡 1
] 𝐻𝑡 = [
ℎ1,𝑡 0 0 0
0 ℎ2,𝑡 0 0
0 0 ℎ3,𝑡 0
0 0 0 ℎ4
]. (4) 
Now let 𝛼𝑡 = [𝛼21,𝑡 , 𝛼31,𝑡 , 𝛼32,𝑡 , 𝛼41,𝑡 , 𝛼42,𝑡 , 𝛼43,𝑡 ]′ be a vector of elements from 𝐴𝑡  that are both 
nonzero and non-unity; and ℎ𝑡 = [ℎ1,𝑡 , ℎ2,𝑡 , ℎ3,𝑡 , ℎ4,𝑡 ]′ be the diagonal elements of 𝐻𝑡. To impose time 
variations in the model, they assume 𝑡 and the free elements from 𝐴𝑡 (non-zero and non-unit) to evolve 
as random walks without drift, and that each element of the vector of volatility ℎ𝑡   to follow a geometric 
random walk (equations (5)-(6)): 
 𝑡 = θt−1 + 𝜈𝑡, 𝜈𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝑄) (5) 
 𝛼𝑡 = αt−1 + 𝑡, 𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝑆) (6) 
 lnℎ𝑖,𝑡= lnℎi,t−1 + 𝜎𝑖 𝑖,𝑡, 𝑡~𝑁(0,1) (7) 
                                                     
17 It should be noted that the amount of natural gas in storage reflects the inventory holders’ view toward expected supply 
shortfalls relative to demand in a future period, rather than future demand or future supply alone. 
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where the error terms 𝜈𝑡, 𝑡, and 𝑡 are independent of each other and normally distributed. Further, a 
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 (8) 
where 𝑆1  ≡ 𝑉𝑎𝑟( 21,𝑡 ),  𝑆2  ≡ 𝑉𝑎𝑟([ 31,𝑡 , 32,𝑡 ]
′), and 𝑆3  ≡ 𝑉𝑎𝑟([ 41,𝑡 , 42,𝑡 , 43,𝑡 ]
′ ). Since 𝐴𝑡 
models the contemporaneous correlations among the endogenous variables, the block-diagonal structure 
of 𝑆 essentially implies that shocks to the contemporaneous correlations are correlated within, but not 
across, equations. Compared to the general case of S being unrestricted, the block-diagonal structure has 
the advantage of simplifying the inference and increasing the efficiency of the estimation algorithm 
(Primiceri, 2005). 
The specification outlined above allows for time variation in both coefficient estimates and the variance-
covariance matrix of the residuals. The former feature allows us to capture possible non-linearities and 
time variation in the lag structure of the endogenous variables, while the latter enables us to model not 
only the heteroscedasticity in the residuals but also changes in the contemporaneous relationships among 
the endogenous variables. These two features combined allow the data to determine whether the time 
variation in the structural relationship among endogenous variables is due to changes in the size of the 
shock and its associated contemporaneous impact, or from changes in the shock transmission mechanism.    
3.3 Identification of Structural Shocks 
Unless the recursive causal chain imposed on endogenous variables is economically justified, a 
recursively-identified structural VAR model cannot be used to generate plausible economic 
interpretations (e.g., Kilian, 2013). As an alternative in recent years, a growing number of papers have 
used sign restrictions for a recursive identification strategy. In a sign-identified structural VAR, each 
identifiable structural shock is required to generate responses among endogenous variables that follow a 
unique sign pattern motivated by direct economic theories. Unlike recursive VARs that are exactly 
identified, a large number of possible solutions are admissible in a sign-identified model as long as the 
responses of endogenous variables fall within the pre-specified sign pattern. Recent examples of using 
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sign-identified structural VARs to disentangle demand and supply shocks in energy markets include 
Arora (2014), Baumeister and Peersman (2013a, 2013b), Kilian and Murphy (2012, 2014), among others. 
Table 1 summarizes the sign restrictions imposed in the present paper to identify structural shocks in the 
US natural gas market:  
Table 1. Sign Restrictions Imposed in the Structural VAR Model 
    Shocks 
















Marketed Production + + + 
Aggregate Demand  + + - 
Inventories . . + 
Real price - + - 
 
Note: All structural shocks are assumed to be positive. Missing entries (denoted “.”) signify that no sign 
restriction is implied in the corresponding impulse response function in the immediate period. 
Our assumptions of how short-run demand and supply contemporaneously respond to structural shocks 
(table 1) follow Arora (2014) and Kilian and Murphy (2014) closely. Conditional on all past data, a 
positive supply shock shifts the natural gas supply curve to the right along the demand curve, and hence 
lowers natural gas prices and increases real economic activity within the same time horizon. The 
responses of natural gas prices and aggregate demand to positive supply shocks at contemporaneous time 
are thus restricted to be non-positive and non-negative, respectively. Kilian and Murphy (2014) argue that 
the impact of supply shocks on speculative inventory demand are ambiguous ex ante. In the event of 
supply disruptions, storage holders may sell out inventories as the opportunity cost associated with storing 
natural gas is high.  However, additional natural gas may be put into storage in anticipation of increases in 
future prices due to supply shortfalls. It is hard to anticipate which effect will dominate the inventory 
market when supply shocks occur, so no restrictions are placed on the responses of precautionary 
inventory demand to supply innovations. 
Our second structural shock stems from unanticipated innovations to aggregate demand not already 
captured by supply shocks. Conditional on all past information, a positive aggregate economic demand 
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shock shifts the downward-slopping demand curve to the right along the supply curve. This shock is 
assumed to not only raise the total supply and real price of natural gas, but also stimulate aggregate real 
economic activity demand at the same period. Similar to supply shocks, no sign restrictions are placed on 
the contemporaneous response of speculative inventory demand to aggregate economic shocks, as 
inventory holders may either increase or decrease their holdings of natural gas. 
Our third structural shock is associated with news about unanticipated changes in future supply and 
demand of natural gas not already embedded in current supply and aggregate economic shocks, which we 
term “speculative inventory demand shock”. If a tighter future supply-and-demand relationship is 
anticipated, such a positive speculative demand shock not only increases the inventory demand in the 
current period, but also shifts the short-run contemporaneous total demand curve to the right along the 
supply curve (conditional on all past information), effectively raising current-period prices. Examples of 
positive speculative demand shock include the news that (1) recoverable reserves of underground natural 
gas are less than the numbers released by the EIA, (2) anticipated technical advances that allow natural 
gas to be used more efficiently and more cleanly, or (3) expectation of increased natural gas exports due 
to future investment in infrastructure that expands the existing pipeline capacity, to name a few. As 
inventory accumulates in anticipation of future supply shortfalls relative to demand, current economic 
activity would be depressed, as less natural gas is available for industrial consumption. Further, the 
expectation that future supply-and-demand conditions will tighten would encourage larger natural gas 
production in the present period, facilitating inventory accumulation. 
Our last shock is considered a residual demand shock, reflecting unanticipated changes in the demand of 
natural gas not already captured by supply, aggregate economic activity, and speculative demand shock. 
As pointed out by Kilian and Murphy (2014), the residual shock is usually hard to interpret economically 
as it is a conglomerate of idiosyncratic demand shocks in the market. Hence, we do not place any 
restrictions on the responses of endogenous variables to the residual shock. 
3.4 Implementation of the Estimation and Identification Procedure 
Following Baumeister and Peersman (2013a, 2013b), the VAR model with time-varying parameters and 
stochastic volatility is estimated using the Bayesian methods of Kim and Nelson (1999). Below, we 
briefly describe the estimation procedure. 
Setting prior distributions. We first obtain the time-invariant OLS estimates of the VAR model 
(equation (1)) for a pre-specified training sample. Denote ̂𝑂𝐿𝑆,  ?̂?( ̂𝑂𝐿𝑆), and ?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆 as estimates of the 
coefficient matrix, the covariance matrix of the coefficient estimates, and the variance-covariance matrix 
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of the reduced-form errors, respectively. Define the Cholesky factorization of ?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆 as ?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆 = 𝐴𝐷𝐴
′, 
where 𝐴 is a lower unit triangular matrix and D is a diagonal matrix with the diagonal elements equal to 
the variances of the residuals (denoted as 𝜇0). Further, we stack the elements of 𝐴
−1 below the diagonal 
row by row so that  ?̂?0 = [?̂?21,0 , ?̂?31,0 , ?̂?32,0 , ?̂?41,0 , ?̂?42,0 , ?̂?43,0 ]′. We set the prior distributions of the 
model parameter as follows: (1)  0~𝑁[ ̂𝑂𝐿𝑆, 4 ?̂?( ̂𝑂𝐿𝑆)], (2) ln(ℎ0)~𝑁[ln (𝜇0), 10 × 𝐼4], where 𝐼4 is a 4 
by 4 identity matrix, and (3) 𝑎0~𝑁[?̂?0, ?̂?|(?̂?0)], where ?̂?|(?̂?0) is a diagonal matrix and the each of the 
diagonal elements equals ten times the absolute value of the corresponding element. As noted by Benati 
and Mumtaz (2007) and Baumeister and Peersman (2013a, 2013b), the scaling of the variance-covariance 
matrices is arbitrary, but are used primarily to make the prior only weakly informative and to account for 
the relative magnitude of the elements in each matrix from the prior distribution. For hyperparameters, we 
follow Baumeister and Peersman (2013a, 2013b) and assume that 𝑄, 𝑆𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2,3) all follow an inverse-
Wishart distribution such that 𝑄~𝐼𝑊(?̅?−1, 𝑇0), 𝑆𝑖~𝐼𝑊(𝑆?̅?
−1
, 𝑖 + 1), where 𝑇0 equals the length of the 
training sample, ?̅? = (0.01)2?̂?( ̂𝑂𝐿𝑆), and 𝑆1̅, 𝑆2̅, 𝑆3̅ are diagonal matrices with the relevant elements in 
?̂?0 multiplied by 10
−3. Finally, the variances of the innovations in equation (7) are assumed to follow an 








), 𝑖 = 1,2,3,4. 
Simulating the posterior distribution. The next step in implementing the Bayesian time-varying VAR 
model is to use the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to generate the joint posterior 
densities for four blocks of parameters: 𝑇 (coefficients),  𝐴𝑇 (the contemporaneous correlation matrix), 
𝐻𝑇 (the variance), and 𝑀 (the hyperparameters including the elements of 𝑄, 𝑆, 𝜎𝑖
2, 𝑖 = 1,2,3,4), where 𝑇 
represents whole sample up to period 𝑇. Specifically, posteriors for each block of the Gibbs sampler are 
generated conditional on the data 𝑌𝑇 and the other parameters obtained at previous steps. In step (1), we 
first obtain the joint posterior density of the VAR parameters using the Bayes rule conditional on 𝐴𝑇, 
𝐻𝑇 ,𝑀, and 𝑌𝑇, and then compute their means and variances via forward and backward recursions. A 
similar algorithm is applied in step (2) to calculate the posterior of 𝐴𝑇 conditional on 𝑇, 𝐻𝑇 , 𝑀, and 𝑌𝑇. 
The volatility states (ℎ𝑖,𝑡) are drawn in the third step following the univariate algorithm of Jacquier et al. 
(1994). Given 𝑇 , 𝐴𝑇, 𝐻𝑇 and 𝑌𝑇, the conditional posterior distribution of the hyperparameteres 𝑀 can 
then be calculated. The joint posterior distribution 𝑝( 𝑇, 𝐴𝑇 , 𝐻𝑇 , 𝑀|𝑌𝑇) is obtained by performing 
100,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler and discarding the first 50,000 draws. 
Imposing sign restrictions. We obtain one random draw from the joint posterior of the time-varying 
lagged coefficients and hyperparameters from the Gibbs sampler at time t, and simulate the future paths 
of the four variables based on the variance-covariance matrix 20 quarters ahead. This accounts for all 
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sources of uncertainty, including variations in lagged coefficients, changing fundamental relationships 
between the four endogenous variables, and additional shocks. To obtain 𝐵0,𝑡, we set 𝑃𝑡𝐷𝑡𝑃𝑡
′ equal to the 
eigenvalue-eigenvector vector decomposition of the decomposition of the covariance matrix  Ω𝑡 in 
equation (8). A 𝑄𝑅 decomposition of 𝐾, an 𝑁 × 𝑁 matrix distributed 𝑁~(0,1), yields a matrix 𝑄 with 
columns orthogonal to each other. The structural impact matrix is then calculated as 𝐵0,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡𝐷𝑡
1/2
𝑄′, and 
together with a 4x1 vector 𝑡 distributed 𝑁~(0,1), the reduced form innovations are calculated 
𝑢𝑡 = 𝐵0,𝑡 𝑡. The impulse response functions are calculated by finding the difference between the levels of 
the four variables with and without a shock. We retain only the impulse response functions that satisfy the 
entire set of sign restrictions, and iterate until we have a set of 500 estimates for each point in time. 
Median and the 16th and 84th percentile values are presented in our analyses. Section 5.3 adds additional 
restrictions on permissible models based on elasticities estimated in Arora (2014), with only minimal 
differences in results.   
4. Data 
The data set adopted in this study follows Arora (2014) and Arora and Lieskovsky (2014) closely. Real 
natural gas prices are the US Producer Price Index (PPI) of natural gas published by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), in which October 1982 is used as the baseline. Compared to the conventional Henry Hub 
spot prices used in many previous studies, the natural gas PPI from BLS has the advantage of being a 
composite price of different natural gas prices in the US, and is available for a relatively long history that 
allows for a greater degree of freedom in econometric analysis. Additionally, it does not need to be 
deflated. To model the supply of natural gas, we use the marketed US natural gas production published by 
the EIA that measures the gas generated in the production process before liquids (such as propane and 
butane) are extracted, in order to exclude the amount of gas consumed either in extraction or processing. 
Aggregate demand for natural gas is represented by an index of industrial production and capacity 
utilization (G.17) constructed by the Federal Reserve Bank. This demand is primarily driven by changes 
in US economic activity. Lastly, the EIA natural gas inventory data is used to measure the precautionary 
inventory demand in anticipation of changes in future supply-and-demand conditions.  
The data period considered begins in 1976 and ends in 2015, and is sampled at a quarterly frequency. We 
use data from 1976Q1 to 1992Q4 as the training sample in the Bayesian time-varying VAR model, and 
use the data from 1993Q1 to 2015Q2 for time series analyses. Our choice of the time period used in 
separating training and estimation periods is motivated by the formal deregulation of the natural gas 
market in 1993. Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938, gas rates in the US had been traditionally regulated 
under the Federal Power Commission. Though the 1978 Natural Gas Policy Act attempted to deregulate 
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the natural gas market, the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989 accelerated this process, 
formally ending all price regulations by January 1993. Combined with FERC order 636, which in 1992 
mandated the unbundling of pipeline services (previously pipelines were able to combine sales and 
transportation), this effectively ended all government control over the market (Joskow, 2013). Finally, 
based on results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, we transform the four variables into their 
logarithmic differences, which essentially measures the quarterly growth rate of each variable. To account 
for the apparent seasonality in consumption and inventory data, we further deseasonalize the four 
variables using seasonal dummies. 
5. Estimation Results 
In this section, we discuss the results from the Bayesian VAR model with time-varying parameters and 
stochastic volatility. Results are organized into sub-sections containing impulse response functions, 
elasticities, forecast error variance decompositions, historical decompositions, and analyses of historical 
events.18 
5.1 Responses to Natural Gas Supply and Demand Shocks 
Standard time-series analysis often reports the impulse response functions of endogenous variables given 
one standard deviation structural shocks. The resulting trajectory of impulse responses traces out the 
average reactions of current and future values of an endogenous variable to a shock to the current value of 
one of the structural innovations. Such an approach, however, may generate misleading results in a time-
varying VAR model as not only the magnitude of each shock differs from period to period, but the 
propagation mechanism through which a structural shock affects the endogenous variables is not constant. 
It is impossible to know ex ante whether a change in response was due to a change in the relationship of 
the variable to each innovation or a change in the magnitude of an innovation. Here, we follow 
Baumeister and Peersman (2013b) and consider shocks comparable along some dimensions of observed 
market changes. We do not attempt to determine the sources of variations, but instead only to establish 
benchmark scenarios against which the changes in impulse responses can be compared across time 
periods. Specifically, in the first scenario, we normalize each structural shock such that each results in a 
1% decrease in marketed US natural gas production. In the second scenario, impulse responses are 
normalized such that each structural shock generates a 10% increase in the real price of natural gas.  
                                                     
18 A lag length of two is used in the estimation. We also considered longer lag lengths, but the results 
appeared to be qualitatively similar. 
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Figure 2 plots the median cumulative responses of four endogenous variables to each structural shock 
which produce a 1% decrease in the marketed natural gas production19. Each response in figures 2-5 are 
accompanied by the 16th and 84th percentiles of their posterior distributions. Consistent with previous 
studies, results in figure 2 suggest that natural gas prices respond to shocks in supply and demand rather 
differently, and that the impact responses vary significantly over time. An unanticipated supply 
disruption, as shown in column (a), generates a rise in natural gas prices, from 5% in 1993 to its highest 
value of 12% in 2000. This dramatic increase in price responsiveness coincides with the formal market 
deregulation in 1993, suggesting an adaptive learning process undertaken by market participants as they 
developed a better understanding of how market functions without government interventions.  
Figure 2. Median Cumulative Impulse Reponses of Aggregate Demand, Inventory Demand, and Price to 
Structural Shocks Normalized on 1% Supply Shortfalls 
 
A negative supply shock is also associated with a reduction in aggregate real economic activity in the US 
and a decline in speculative inventory demand. However, the impact of supply disruptions on aggregate 
demand is rather limited overall. Even during the great recession of 2007-2009, the median impact 
response of aggregate economic activity to supply disruptions was at most -0.6%, which is consistent with 
                                                     
19 Note the responses of natural gas production are omitted from the plot because we have normalized its response to each 
structural shock to be -1%. 
42 
 
a number of previous studies that find a limited role of natural gas supply shocks in domestic economic 
activities in the US (e.g., Kliesen, 2006).  
Column (b) of figure 2 displays responses to a negative shock in aggregate demand leading to a 1% 
decrease in marketed natural gas production. Consistent with results from supply shocks, a gradual 
decline in price responsiveness was observed after peaking in 2000, partly reflecting the ability of market 
participants to better manage price risks from unforeseen demand shocks in an increasingly maturing 
natural gas market after deregulation. Comparing columns (a) and (b) of figure 2, it is apparent that 
speculative demand responds differently to unanticipated shocks to supply and aggregate demand. A 
negative aggregate demand shock leads to an increase in speculative inventory demand, whereas a 
negative supply shock leads to a decrease. These findings are consistent with previous theoretical work on 
storable commodities that inventory plays a vital role in mitigating price fluctuations due to supply and 
demand shocks (e.g., Working, 1949; Pindyck, 2001). However, it should be noted that starting from 
2013, the increase in inventory after a negative aggregate demand shock is minimal, reflecting market 
participants’ bearish expectation that low natural gas prices are likely to prevail for an extended period of 
time with the apparent oversupply in the market. 
Panel (c) of figure 2 suggests that an unanticipated negative speculative demand shock is needed to 
reduce marketed natural gas production. Following a decrease in speculative demand, aggregate demand 
associated with real economic activity declines marginally and the real price decreases. However, the 
magnitude of price changes from a speculative inventory demand shock appears to be significantly 
smaller than either a supply or an aggregate demand shock.  
In the second scenario, we normalize our impulse responses such that each structural shock raises the real 
natural gas price by 10%. Results plotted in figure 3 corroborates findings from figure 2.20 Additionally, 
we note in panel (b) of figure 3 that although the responses of natural gas production to a positive 
aggregate economic shock have changed over the sample period, their relative impacts in recent years are 
small. Due to the substantial capital investment required for natural gas production, a firm’s ability to take 
advantage of a temporary positive aggregate demand shock is likely to be limited.  
  
                                                     




Figure 3. Median Impulse Reponses of Aggregate Demand, Inventory Demand, and Price to Structural 
Shocks Normalized on 10% Price Increase 
 
5.2 Estimating Supply and Demand Elasticities in the US Natural Gas Market 
Direct estimation of price elasticities in the natural gas market is difficult, as the observed movements in 
quantity and price are often driven by a combination of supply and demand factors that are hard to 
disentangle. However, in a structural VAR model, structural shocks are by definition mutually 
uncorrelated, each generating unique reactions in the endogenous variables, with each having direct 
economic interpretations. In our model, we have identified structural shocks by imposing unique sign 
patterns in the contemporaneous responses of endogenous variables. Since these structural shocks induce 
responses in the natural gas market variables by shifting either the demand or supply curve, we can 
calculate the implied short-run price elasticities from impulse responses associated with each structural 
shock by dividing the percentage changes in quantity with the percentage changes in prices. 
Figure 4 presents the evolution of median short-run price elasticities of natural gas supply and demand in 
the US between 1994 and 2015. Note that in our analysis we consider three different dimensions of 
demand shocks each of which can shift the demand curve upward or downward. Hence we trace out the 
curvature of the supply curve associated with aggregate demand and inventory demand shocks. As can be 
seen, elasticity estimates presented in figure 4 confirm our findings from impulse responses that the 
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supply of natural gas in the US responds differently depending on the nature of the demand shock. Except 
the early part of the sample, the median supply elasticities associated with aggregate demand shocks have 
been rather stable, oscillating between 0.06 and 0.1 (panel (a), figure 4). Even during the period of rapid 
shale production, the supply elasticity associated with aggregate demand shock has only increased 
slightly, settling at around 0.1 in 2015.  
Figure 4. Median Natural Gas Price Elasticities of Demand and Supply Derived from Impulse Responses 
Estimates (1993-2015) 
 
The evolution of supply elasticity due to speculative demand shocks is presented in panel (b) of figure 4. 
Much larger variations are observed for the first ten years of the sample (1994-2003), but since then the 
curvature of the supply curve derived from speculative demand shocks has remained close to 0.25. 
Results suggest that natural gas supply in the US may have been more responsive to precautionary 
inventory demand shocks than aggregate demand shocks. Additionally, though natural gas supply in the 
US is inelastic overall, elasticity has increased slightly since the shale boom. Arora (2014) argues that 
such increases in elasticity should not be surprising as production can take place faster when extracting 
natural gas from shale formation as compared to conventional production methods. Overall the increase in 
supply elasticity is small. 
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Panel (c) of figure 4 plots the median price elasticities of demand derived from shifts in the supply 
curve.21 After a decrease in the magnitude of elasticity (steeper demand curve) in the first five years of the 
sample, the demand elasticity in the US natural gas market remained relatively stable for the following 15 
years, fluctuating around -0.10. Recently, however, the demand curve has somewhat flattened, possibly 
reflecting a greater flexibility in energy substitution as industrial, commercial, and residential users are 
better able to switch among different fuel sources. As a result, a similar price change induces a larger 
impact in quantity demanded than before.  
Our elasticity estimates are in general consistent with the numbers reported in Arora (2014) using 
quarterly data. Excluding the shale boom period (1993-2007), Arora (2014) finds that while quarterly 
demand elasticities remained similar, the supply was considerably less elastic (0.01 and 0.10 for 
elasticities derived from aggregate demand and inventory demand shocks, respectively). Our results, by 
contrast, suggest a smaller increase in price elasticity of supply after the shale production boom. 
Additionally, our results are comparable with several previous supply elasticity estimates in the US 
natural gas market. Dahl (1992) and Barret (1992) estimated domestic price elasticity of supply to equal 
0.41 and 0.014 respectively, however both studies use data sampled at the yearly interval. Krichene 
(2002) estimated the long-run price elasticity of supply at the world level to be 0.6, and at the short-run 
elasticity to be -0.06 during 1918-1999. At the monthly interval, Ponce and Neumann (2014) estimate that 
after one month, the price elasticity of supply is equal to 0.056, similar to our estimate of response 
associated with aggregate demand.   
5.3 Robustness Checks 
Kilian and Murphy (2012, 2014) argue that using sign restrictions alone only provides weak identification 
of structural shocks in a VAR model. In addition to sign restriction, elasticity bounds should be used to 
reduce the set of admissible models. By retaining only models that produce plausible estimates of 
elasticities, it can be ensured that results are associated with economically reasonable interpretations. 
However, as identified in Arora (2014), very few papers in the literature have investigated the quarterly 
supply elasticities of the natural gas market in the US, and the demand elasticity has mostly focused on 
the residential demand side. For a check on the robustness of our results, we use twice the median 
elasticity estimates of Arora (2014) obtained for the 1993-2013 period as a bound to construct ranges for 
model admission. Specifically, we postulate that the short-run elasticity of demand elasticity cannot 
                                                     
21 Kilian and Murphy (2014) and Arora (2014) differentiate price elasticity of demand between those in use and in production. 
Here we only consider the price elasticity of demand in production  
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exceed -0.28, and that the supply elasticities associated with aggregate and speculative demand shocks 
cannot exceed 0.1 and 0.26, respectively. 
Figure 5 plots the median impulse response functions from admissible models that fall within the 
elasticity bounds, normalized on 1% decreases in marketed natural gas production. In general, results 
appear qualitatively similar when no restrictions are imposed. A comparison between figures 2 and 5 
suggests that shocks to production are virtually identical with or without bounds. While there are 
noticeable differences in results with other impulse response functions, they maintain the movements, and 
are only a small percent difference. Two exceptions are the price responses to aggregate and speculative 
demand shocks (last chart of panels (b) and (c)). Larger magnitudes are observed for these two impulse 
responses toward the end of the sample, indicating that aggregate demand and speculative inventory 
shocks are playing a greater role in recent years. These results are not unexpected as rather stringent 
restrictions are imposed on demand and supply elasticities—a similar shock would on average generate 
larger price responses. Regardless, our results without elasticity bounds are qualitatively comparable to 




Figure 5. Robustness Check – Median Cumulative Impulse Reponses of Aggregate Demand, Inventory 




6. What Drives Variations in the Real Price of Natural Gas? 
Impulse response functions and elasticity estimates provide useful information on the responses of 
endogenous variables following a one-time structural shock. However, they do not consider the relative 
importance of each structural shock on the evolution of price movements over time. To shed light on this 
issue, we investigate the forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD) and historical decompositions 
(HD) of natural gas prices following the structural VAR estimation. 
Figure 6 plots the median contribution of each structural shock to the forecast error variance of real 
prices, along with their 16th and 84th percentile posterior distributions. It can be seen that the explanatory 
power of supply shocks peaked in 1999, 2005, and again in 2013, accounting for approximately 35 
percent of the error variance of real natural gas price forecasts. Noticeable declines are observed during 
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the great recession and another after 2013. Regardless, the relative contribution of supply disruptions to 
the total variance of the natural gas price forecast error has been consistently above 25% throughout the 
sample period, suggesting the important role played by supply shocks in the US natural gas market since 
deregulation.  
Figure 6. Medium FEVD of Real Natural Gas Prices in the US (1993-2015) 
 
Panel (b) of figure 6 suggests that a similar fraction of the price forecast error variance is attributable to 
shocks in aggregate economic demand prior to 2009, after which its explanatory power dramatically 
declined to about 20%, though a small rebound was observed at the very end of the sample.  By contrast, 
with the exception of the pre-2000 period, residual shocks (other natural gas market demand shocks not 
accounted by the other three shocks) have consistently accounted for about 30 percent variation in the 
natural gas price movements. Results suggest that much of the natural gas price variability in the US may 
be due to market-specific demand factors such as consumers’ preference changes, technology 
improvement that enabled more efficient uses of household appliances, substitution with other energy 
sources in electricity generation, demographic movements, etc. 
Compared with the other three shocks, the relative importance of precautionary inventory demand shocks 
in shaping price movements has changed considerably. As shown in figure 6, close to 20% of the forecast 
error variances of prices can be explained by inventory demand shocks in mid-1990s. For the next decade, 
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however, only between 5-8% of the error variance is attributable to inventory demand shocks. In recent 
years its explanatory power has increased again, accounting for over 10% of the variation in natural gas 
prices in 2015. Our results highlight the important role that inventories perform, regulating the prices of 
storable commodities as forward-looking agents increase or decrease inventory in anticipation of changes 
in future supply-and-demand conditions. However, it should be noted that precautionary inventory 
demand shocks remain a small force in the US natural gas market compared to shocks from fundamentals. 
Figure 7 plots the median historical contribution of the four structural shocks to the evolution of natural 
gas price returns in the US. The solid black line shows the deviation of the deseasonalized natural gas 
price returns from its mean, and the dashed blue line traces the cumulative effect of the specific structural 
shock to the evolution of natural gas prices assuming occurrence of no other structural shocks. In other 
words, the historical decomposition indicates how the price of natural gas would have evolved had only 
one structural shock occurred.22 As is evident in figure 7, the cumulative effect of each structural shock to 
natural gas price fluctuations has changed significantly from period to period. Below, we examine three 
historical episodes characterized by large price volatility to shed light on the relative importance of each 
structural shock in the US natural gas market. 
  
                                                     
22 Note that since we deseasonalized our data prior to estimating the time-varying VAR model, the solid 
black line may behave differently from the actual price movements. 
50 
 
Figure 7. Historical Decomposition of Demeaned Real Natural Gas Price Changes (Demeaned Data in 
Black and Contribution of the Structural Shock in Blue) 
 
6.1 How Much Did Shale Production Contribute to the Collapse of Natural Gas Prices? 
Technological advances in drilling methods have made it profitable to extract natural gas from shale and 
other low-permeability formations. Since 2006, the popularization of combined hydraulic fracturing and 
horizontal drilling technologies have revolutionized the US natural gas market. Prior to the mid-2000s, 
natural gas production in the US had been on a slow decline for more than three decades. However, 
between 2006 and 2015, US dry natural gas production has increased by 39.04%23, largely attributable to 
the substantial increase in gas from unconventional sources. Meanwhile, natural gas prices in the US have 
plummeted, dropping more than 82% from their peak in 2008 at approximately $10.79 per thousand cubic 
                                                     
23 See EIA dry production data at: https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9070us2a.htm.  
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feet to $1.89 in May 201224, though a small rebound was observed afterwards. Economists and market 
analysts have largely attributed such dramatic price declines to expansion in shale gas production.  
Our results in figure 7 indicate that shocks to natural gas production have played a much more significant 
role in recent years compared to the pre-shale era. Their importance is particularly evident after 2010, 
when the line indicating projected price movements with only supply shocks virtually overlaps the actual 
price line during this period. However, the role of aggregate demand and speculative inventory demand 
shocks cannot be ignored. As is evident, price movements assuming only aggregate demand shocks have 
largely followed the same trend as the actual price fluctuations in the post-shale period, highlighting again 
the importance of real economic activities in the natural gas market. Further, it appears that precautionary 
inventory demand shocks could explain part of the price movements at the end of 2012, and again in 
2014. 
6.2 The Price Escalation in 2007-2008 
Among all the historical events in the US natural gas market that experienced a dramatic price volatility, 
its price escalation in 2007-2008 is perhaps the least understandable and the most complex (e.g., Smead, 
2010). In the beginning of 2007, wellhead prices in the US were still fluctuating between $6 and $7 per 
thousand cubic feet. However, by the summer of 2008, the price of natural gas had almost doubled, 
exceeding $10 per thousand cubic feet25. At the same time, shale production started to expand and the 
market was in fact in over-supply. EIA data suggested that the domestic gas production in the first quarter 
of 2008 was almost 10% higher than the same quarter of 2007, with consumption rates (the difference 
between total availability and inventory) essentially flat. This appears to be inconsistent with classic 
demand and supply theory. So, why did the price of natural gas increase so much in such a short time 
period? 
To understand this phenomena, three relevant facts need to be considered. First, historically the price of 
natural gas has been closely linked to oil prices. The two prices have been linked for more than two 
decades since the formal deregulation of the natural gas market in 1993. Economists have generally 
believed that there exists a long-run relationship (cointegration) between the two price series. Crude oil 
prices started their run in 2007, increasing more than 245% in less than two years, peaking at 
$133.88/barrel in the summer of 2008 before plummeting to $41.12/barrel in December 200826. Second, 
                                                     
24 See EIA natural gas price data at: https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm.  
25 See EIA natural gas wellhead price data at https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm.  




a large number of commodities, including energies, grains, softs, and metals all experienced similar price 
run-ups during this period. A common view in the literature is that speculators partly, if not fully, caused 
the systematic price increases in commodity markets. Third, even prior to the financial crisis, the housing 
market had already started its collapse in 2007. Previous literature has proposed a “bubble migration” 
theory in which financial bubbles first migrated from real estate to the bond market, and then 
subsequently to the commodity markets (e.g., Phillips and Yu, 2011). In other words, the price rises and 
falls may have been linked to the overall business cycles in the US and in the world.  
Figure 7 suggests that speculation may have indeed partly affected natural gas price movements in 2008. 
Assuming only speculative inventory demand shocks, the trajectory of price movements (blue line) 
appears to closely track the actual price behavior (black line). A similar result may be found in figure 6, 
which indicates a small increase in the explanatory power of inventory demand shocks on price forecast 
error variance during this period. In anticipating tighter future demand-and-supply conditions, market 
participants may have increased their inventory to be carried into future periods for potential profits. 
However, such an impact is only short-lived, as the actual price behavior drifts away from the path 
projected by only inventory demand shocks. By contrast, supply and aggregate demand shocks account 
for the bulk of the price volatility during this period. The projected price movements assuming only 
supply or aggregate demand shocks appear to line up closely with the line indicating actual price 
movements. 
Overall our results are consistent with previous studies investigating the speculative influences in the 
natural gas market. Bohl and Stephan (2013) find that financialization in the natural gas market did not 
significantly increase spot price volatility, while Manera et al. (2014) reported that in the short-run 
speculation did partially increase price volatility, though this effect becomes negative in the long-run. 
Meanwhile Geman and Ohana (2009) stated that the correlation between spot price volatility and natural 
gas inventories is negative only in periods of scarcity, when inventory is below its long run average for 
natural gas. Results from this study showed that though the impact of speculation cannot be ignored, it 
plays a very limited role in natural gas price fluctuation in 2008. Instead, price movements predominantly 
reflect changes in fundamentals. 
6.3 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 
Significant supply disruptions occurred to the US natural gas market in the second half of 2005 when 
hurricanes Katrina and Rita hit the Gulf of Mexico. Before the hurricanes hit, Louisiana and the federal 
offshore production areas in the Gulf accounted for approximately 20% of the total natural gas production 
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in the US27. These back-to-back hurricanes damaged offshore platforms, major processing facilities, and 
major pipeline segments, resulting in the loss of over 6 billion cubic a feet per day of offshore natural gas 
supply for an extended period of time. Even months after the storms, the equivalent of 10% of US 
consumption remained shut-in due to problems with transportation and production (Kumins and 
Bamberger, 2005). These prolonged supply disruptions put extreme pressure on the supply-demand 
conditions in the US natural gas market, as fears rose in anticipation of heightened winter heating costs. 
As a result, the price of natural gas exceed $10.3 per thousand cubic feet in October 2005. However, 
prices dropped quickly, reaching $6.85 in February 2006 as winter that year turned out to be much 
warmer than anticipated. Low natural gas prices lasted into the rest of the 2006 until the spike in 2008. 
This explanation implies that supply shocks in the structural model should account for most of the US 
natural gas market price surge in 2005. Results in figure 6 suggest that the implied price movements 
assuming only supply shocks in 2005 line up closely with the actual path of price behavior. Precautionary 
inventory and aggregate demand shocks, on the other hand, do little to explain the initial price run-ups in 
2005. The story changes in 2006, when it appears that aggregate demand shocks do partly explain the 
natural gas price plunge. 
7. Conclusions 
An integral component of the US economy, the natural gas industry has undergone considerable changes 
over the past two decades, with the price of natural gas becoming increasingly volatile over time. 
Effective policy responses to these price changes and other exogenous shocks require a thorough 
understanding of the underlying drivers behind natural gas price movements. The purpose of this paper is 
to shed light on this issue by analyzing the time-varying effects of supply and demand shocks on the 
natural gas market in the US from 1993 to 2015 using a structural vector autoregression model. 
Specifically, we disentangle the real natural gas prices into four structural shocks: unanticipated supply 
shocks, aggregate demand shocks, precautionary inventory demand shocks, and residual shocks. Previous 
studies using a similar approach suffer from four apparent drawbacks: (1) ignoring the time variation in 
the model parameters, (2) assuming discrete abrupt structural breaks, (3) assuming residual 
homoscedasticity, and (4) imposing a recursive causal chain in contemporaneous correlations. In this 
paper, we follow Baumeister and Peersman (2013a, 2013b) and seek to address these four problems using 
                                                     
27 See EIA Gulf of Mexico dry natural gas production data at: 




a sign-identified structural vector autoregression model that allows for both drifting parameters and time-
varying volatility.  
Overall, we find that natural gas prices respond to shocks in supply and demand rather differently, and the 
impact responses differ rather significantly over time. An unanticipated supply disruption raises natural 
gas prices, reduces the aggregate economic demand, and decreases the precautionary inventory demand. 
Though supply shortfalls overall have a limited impact on aggregate economic demand, their negative 
effect may have been exacerbated in a bearish market when the overall economy was shrinking. Inventory 
demand decreases in response to supply disruptions, apparently dominating the positive precautionary 
demand of inventory by forward-looking market participants who anticipate a potential gain for carrying 
natural gas into a future period. A negative aggregate demand shock, on the other hand, depresses natural 
gas prices, reduces natural gas production, and encourages precautionary inventory demand. Consistent 
with findings from supply shocks, a gradual decline in price responsiveness (smaller magnitudes) was 
observed after peaking in 2000. The limited response of inventory demand since 2013 possibly reflects 
the bearish view of market participants toward natural gas prices in anticipation of a prolonged period 
with abundant natural gas supply.  
Based on the estimated impulse response functions, we calculate the price elasticities of supply and 
demand. With the exception of the early part of the sample, the median supply elasticity associated with 
aggregate economic demand shocks is estimated to be between 0.06-0.1. The median supply elasticity 
associated with speculative inventory demand shocks appear to be of larger magnitudes, ranging from 
0.15 to 0.3. For both supply elasticities a small increase in magnitude is observed toward the end of the 
sample, possibly due to the fact that new drilling technology has enabled increased production. The price 
elasticities of demand are estimated to be between -0.18 and -0.08 over the sample period. Similarly, the 
magnitude of demand elasticity increased in recent years, possibly indicating that in the new era 
characterized with ample natural gas supply, industrial and residential users may have greater flexibility 
of substitution in fuel use. Our elasticity estimates overall appear to be consistent with the numbers 
reported in Arora (2014) using quarterly data. 
We further investigate the relative importance of the four structural shocks in driving natural gas price 
movements using forecast error variance and historical decompositions. We find that supply shocks 
consistently account for over 25% of the price variation in the post-regulation era. The explanatory power 
of aggregate demand shocks is high as well, typically accounting for over 20% of the price forecast error 
variance over time. We also note that there is a large portion of forecast error variance that cannot be 
explained by supply, aggregate demand, and speculative demand shocks. 
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To put our impact estimates of supply and demand shocks into perspective, we examine three historical 
episodes. The recent shale boom constitutes the first episode, during which the production of natural gas 
skyrocketed and its price plummeted due to improved drilling technologies. We find that shocks to natural 
gas production can explain the bulk of the price movement in this period, a finding consistent with the 
general view of market analysts. However, the role of aggregate demand and speculative inventory 
demand shocks cannot be overlooked, as these two shocks combined could explain part of the price 
movements at the end of 2012 and in 2014.  
In the second historical episode, we investigate the 2007-2008 price escalation in the US natural gas 
market when the production was in fact larger than usual. We find that speculation can at least partly 
explain the price variation during this period. However, contrary to common belief, the impact is only 
short-lived and of small magnitude. By contrast, supply and aggregate demand shocks can account for the 
bulk of the price volatility during this period. In the third episode, we investigate the 2005 price spike 
during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and find that the implied price movements assuming only supply 
shocks in 2005 line up closely with the actual path of price behavior.  
Our analyses provide a comprehensive and innovative framework for understanding the demand and 
supply shocks and their impacts on prices in the US natural gas market. Results in this study highlight the 
importance of incorporating time variations in model parameters. Not only have the impulse responses 
evolved over time, the relative importance of structural shocks in driving natural gas price movements 
vary rather significantly in different periods as well. Such variability in model parameters, if ignored, 
could potentially misinform policymakers and lead to policies detrimental not only to the natural gas 
industry but also the economy as a whole. The estimation and model identification strategy outlined in 
this study enables us to address this issue by more accurately gauging the effects of supply and demand 
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Chapter 4 - Essay #3: How Sub-State Policies Affect the Western US Residential Solar Market: an 


















Abstract: This paper adds to the literature by applying a hierarchical spatial model to investigate whether 
municipal, county, and utility policies drive residential solar photovoltaic (PV) adoption. Spatial 
econometric techniques are utilized to account for the peer effects and spatial clustering that have been 
found recently in residential PV markets. A hierarchical model is chosen to account for nested structure of 
the influencing policies. The properly reported marginal effects suggest that after controlling for solar 
resource, environmental preference, and other demographic information, the local policies are an 
important driver in the residential solar PV market. The average sub-state solar policy is associated with a 
7.7 increase in per capita installed residential capacity in the individual county, and a total of 12.7 percent 
increase across all counties. Further, the residential market exhibits a moderate but significant amount of 




A market failure exists when the price mechanism fails to account for all associated costs and benefits in 
the market. The emission of heat-trapping greenhouse gases (GHGs) generated by the production of 
electricity from non-renewable sources is one such failure. These GHGs represent a significant externality 
to production. Accordingly, the social costs of production are higher than those felt privately, leading to 
lower equilibrium prices and higher consumption of carbon-based electricity than what would be 
otherwise realized at the social optimum. With increased understanding of both this market failure and its 
implications to current and future economic development, policymakers tried to provide incentives to 
promote renewable energy generation.  
Solar is one such option. As a substitute to non-renewable electricity production, it is an attractive non-
carbon based option: increased solar generation could help reduce carbon-based generation to socially 
optimal values while helping meet the predicted increase in consumption levels. Of the three main non-
carbon based generation methods, wind, solar, and hydro, only wind and solar have large potential to 
increase their capacity, as nearly all optimal dam locations have been utilized. While certainly 
intermittent, solar generation will always have a baseline generation capacity, as even on the cloudiest 
days some generation is possible. There are trade-offs for large-scale solar generation: large land 
requirements in potentially sensitive environments have caused some activist groups, otherwise in support 
of solar generation, to raise concerns. Further, often new or improved transmission lines are required for 
connecting utility-scale plants to consumption areas. However commercial and residential scale solar are 
seen by some as more attractive, as the generation infrastructure can fit on existing and available rooftops. 
In addition to the use of solar energy to heat and light a home or business, there are two main 
technologies able to harness solar energy: solar photovoltaic (henceforth solar PV) technologies generate 
electricity, while solar thermal systems provide water heating. While both replace carbon-emitting 
electricity production, solar PV does so directly, and has generated significantly more interest in 
individual homeowners, businesses, and policymakers alike. 
The installation of a solar PV generation system requires significant upfront financial resources. 
According to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), a residential PV system costs on 
average $3.09 per watt of installed capacity, or more than $15,000 for a 5 kW system before government 
and utility financial incentives (Chung et al, 2015). That said, their costs are decreasing. Figure 1 displays 
the cost reduction in these values: since Q4 2013 the cost of solar has decreased by 7%, since Q4 2009 
that reduction is larger than 55% (Chung et al, 2015). These costs have continued their descent into 2015, 
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with the majority of cost reductions coming from declines in soft costs. However some price declines 
have been offset by falling incentives (Barbose and Darghouth, 2015).  
Figure 1: Costs of Residential Solar PV Installations 
 
Source: Chung et al, 2015 
Even with this reduction the financial benefits of a system, namely the offset of electricity that would be 
otherwise purchased from a utility, surpass the upfront costs only years after their installation. While the 
exact timing depends on the costs and financial incentives available to the homeowner, the difference 
explains a significant amount of the energy efficiency ‘gap’: the difference between the economically 
advantageous and actual amount of solar generation installed. A number of third party firms now 
capitalize on this opportunity by installing and owning entire home systems, while selling the generated 
electricity either directly to the home or to the connecting utility. Regardless of the financing, the 
adoption of residential solar is considered a social good, and has received considerable attention recently 
in the literature. 
Borenstein (2015) evaluated the residential solar PV market in California, and found that while it is 
primarily high-income individuals adopting, that disparity has declined. Further, he finds that adoption is 
driven by the heaviest electricity-consuming households. California’s electricity rate structure is tiered, 
and adopting households generally pay significantly higher rates for electricity, suggesting that both rate 
structure and are important considerations. This tiered pricing structure was also found to be significant in 
California by Dargouth et al. (2011). Bauner and Crago (2015) apply an option value framework to 
household solar PV decisions, finding that policies that reduce uncertainty could be the most effective 
stimulants to adoption.  
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Alongside household financial and personal characteristics, the financial incentives provided are key 
drivers in the choice of home solar adoption. From individual municipalities to the federal government, 
political organizations at nearly every level offer varying forms of financial assistance to help spread the 
diffusion of solar power. A number of studies have evaluated the impact that specific state policies have 
had on the solar PV market: Crago (2014) and Sarzynski et al. (2012) evaluate residential markets, and 
Shrimali and Jenner (2013) look at both residential and commercial. Borchers et al. (2014) find similar 
effects between specific policies and wind and solar adoption on US farms, however using a different set 
of state policies. Kwan (2012) also models residential PV adoption, however he measures the effects of an 
average level of state incentives. There is some recent evidence that increased solar incentive policy is 
associated with price increases (Gillingham et al., 2016). 
None of the preceding study models the effects of federal policy, as those effects are felt everywhere in 
their study area. Similarly, none measure the impact that sub-state regulatory processes create. This may 
be an important omission: Two studies (Burkhardt et al, 2015, Dong and Wiser, 2013) highlight how local 
permitting and regulations can greatly influence both adoption prices and development times. Li and Yi 
(2014) do investigate sub-state policy’s impact on solar PV deployment, finding that along with state 
policies like RPSs, sub-state policies have positive and significant effects on residential adoption.  
However the choice to adopt solar power is not strictly a financial decision. The understanding of solar 
technology is an important predictor of residential adoption, leading Islam and Meade (2013) to 
recommend education policies to stimulate solar adoption. Noll et al. (2014) demonstrate how Solar 
Community Organizations have been an effective means of reducing barriers to adoption. Peer effects are 
also demonstrated to impact adoption at the zip code level (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012 and Snape 
and Rynikiewicz, 2012). Gillinghman et al. (2016) also find that the density of solar installers 
significantly lowers prices.  
There have been recent attempts to quantifying these peer effects. Marcello and Gillingham (2015) find 
notable clustering in the solar PV adoption, patterns that do not merely follow intuitive spatial patterns of 
either income of population. Richter (2013) empirically demonstrates small but significant social 
spillovers in UK installations at the neighborhood level. Balta-Ozkan et al. (2015) further quantify these 
spatial spillovers in UK solar PV adoption by utilizing spatial econometric methods, which this study 
follows builds upon looking at the western US market.  
The goal of this paper is to follow the analysis of Li and Yi (2014) in asking whether sub-state policies 
have an influential impact on residential solar PV adoption. Using a unique dataset created to 
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geographically locate relevant incentivizing policies, this paper improves the literature by providing the 
first application of a Bayesian hierarchical spatial model to investigate whether sub-state policies are 
associated with any difference in the amount of per capita residential solar PV capacity. Finding suggest 
that after controlling for relevant demographic, environmental, and solar potential variables, local policies 
are found to have a positive and significant impact on the residential market. Further, solar PV adoption is 
estimated to have a moderate but significant spatial dependence.  
2. Hypothesized Model 
The main empirical goal of this paper is to accurately model the key drivers of solar adoption in the 
Western United states. Given the cited literature above, I create equation (1) as a hypothesized linear 
model of the market: 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝑃𝑖γ + 𝐸𝑖𝛿 + 𝐻𝑖𝜙 + 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝑆𝑖𝜅 + 𝑆𝑡𝑖𝜓 + 𝜖𝑖 (1) 
The dependent variable 𝑦𝑖 represents the total amount of solar PV capacity in county 𝑖. In the study area, 
of the WECC, there are 405 counties. 𝑋𝑖 is an nxk matrix of k county-level demographic characteristics 
such as income, age, race, and population and homeownership. Nearly all empirical studies have 
suggested that income and solar adoption have a strong positive correlation. The level of homeownership 
is likely an important predictor of residential solar adoption. Similar to other home improvements, renters 
face little incentive and likely possess less ability to pay the large up-front costs of solar installations. 
Further, landlords will have significantly less incentive to add solar PV to rental units, especially given 
the high opportunity cost they would face: those resources could otherwise be spent in ways that would 
quickly and reliably increase rent, such as newer appliances, better heating, etc.    
𝑃𝑡 is an nx1 vector of electricity prices. Solar installations are a substitute to purchasing electricity from a 
utility. A positive relationship, with higher prices incentivizing greater adoption, is both intuitive and 
empirically demonstrated in Borenstein (2015) and Dargouth et al. (2011). However this relationship 
could exhibit a degree of endogeneity, as greater share of electricity generated by solar PV could also 
impact prices. In fact, utilities often argue increased solar PV integration raises prices, as it requires 
increased effort to manage its intermittent generation. 𝐸𝑖 represents an nx1 vector of environmental 
preferences. There are a number of important positive environmental outcomes from large-scale adoption 
of solar power, mainly the reduction of GHG emission and improvements in air and water quality caused 
by a reduction in coal or natural gas emissions. Capturing these preferences likely helps explain the 
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household decision28. 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖 is an nxr matrix of solar policies that residents in county i at time t face, where 
r is equal to the number of geographic levels of policy. For example, a household in Oakland will receive 
the incentives from any policy run by the city, Alameda County, their electric utility (PG&E), the state of 
California, and by the US federal government, and each will vary given the year. Finally, 𝑆𝑡𝑡 represents a 
vector of state fixed effects that would capture any additional differences between states affecting solar 
adoption (e.g. labor costs, construction and connection standards, etc). The states in this sample area 
likely have significant difference in permitting, labor, and safety regulations. While the impact of each 
individual regulatory difference on the solar PV market is likely small, aggregated these could make non-
trivial differences.  
3. Data 
3.1 Solar Installations 
Data for residential solar capacity was obtained from the Open PV Project29. Produced by the National 
Renewable Energy Lab (NREL), the Open PV project is a comprehensive dataset of solar PV 
installations, with data contributed by utilities, installers, and the general public. Data is validated by 
NREL through a variety of ways, in part based on the trust NREL gives to the reporter. I used data from 
counties in the Western Electricity Coordination Council (WECC) region of Oregon, Washington, 
California, Utah, Nevada, Colorado, Wyoming, Arizona, and parts of New Mexico, Montana, Texas, and 
South Dakota. Individual home installation data are aggregated to the county level. Following Kwan 
(2012), I limit the upper range of individual solar installations to 10 kW to ensure that the solar 
installations included are in fact residential systems (n=230,152)30. The distribution of installed solar 
capacity in 2016 (Figure 2, Panel A) and number of solar PV installations (Figure 2, Panel B) is highly 
concentrated in the Southwest part of the WECC. Given both the large number of zeros and the right-
skewedness of the distribution of county kW installed capacity, I use an inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation, which accommodates zero values but otherwise is directly interpretable as a log 
transformation (see Burbidge et al, 1988, MacKinnon and Magee, 1990).  
                                                     
28 However strict environmental preference may not be the best explanatory variable: while there is a strong 
correlation between environmental preference and the political left, energy independence is a trait shared across the 
political spectrum. There are some for example with strongly divergent views about the importance of air quality 
who nevertheless support the increase in solar generation 
29 For more information about data methodology, see https://openpv.nrel.gov/about. 
30 As of 4/15/2016 
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Figure 2: Residential Solar PV Capacity and Number of Installations, 2016 
Panel A                                                                      Panel B 
           
 
3.2 Policy Variables 
State, utility, county, and municipality policies are collected from the North Carolina Clean Energy’s 
Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE, 2015). The DSIRE database is a 
comprehensive collection of policies and incentives that involve renewable energy and energy efficiency 
growth in the US. There are 43 categories of renewable policy; from corporate tax credits to feed-in 
tariffs. From these categories, I select from all but the corporate and utility categories those designated 
with as solar technologies. While many of these policies are at the state level, a significant number are 
enacted by cities, counties, and utilities. Dong and Wiser (2013) provide evidence that city-level 
permitting tangibly affects both the price and development time of residential PV installations. With this 
in mind, I include both municipality and county policies. However given that demographic data is only 
available at the county level, I aggregate municipal policies to the county level. Only policies in the 
county’s dominant population center are included, however there were only a small number of municipal 
policies in a county that were not included at the county level, as in general municipal policies are enacted 
in larger cities that dominate the majority of the county. 
Renewable policies from utilities are important to include in the analysis as well. Investor-owned utilities 
(IOUs) are generally not interested in measuring and/or correcting for social costs. Further, they have 
some disincentive for the increase of solar energy: Solar PV is both distributed and intermittent, making 
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their job of providing electricity at all hours difficult and often more expensive. However, there are some 
reasons for IOUs to promote residential solar PV capacity additions: Evidence. Further, municipal utilities 
and electric cooperatives are generally more attuned to both customer preferences as well as larger 
problems, and more insulated from the pressure to increase profit. Thus I include solar policies at the 
utility level. Assigning them to a particular county can be difficult, as their boundaries often do not align 
perfectly with county jurisdictions. I follow the similar path with that of city-level policies: counties 
whose main population centers within a utilities coverage area are said to be affected by this policy, and 
vice versa. Utility coverage areas for most states in the WECC are available through individual states’ 
Public Utility Commissions, with varying degrees of resolution. Only California has utility coverage areas 
available in shapefile formats: for the rest utility coverage images were georeferenced and interpolated 
using ArcGIS. I combine these sub-state policies from the utility, county, and municipality level into one 
‘Local’ value for each county, and another reflecting the policies for the state in which the county resides. 
The distribution of state solar policies are displayed in panel A of figure 3. As can be seen, significant 
variation happens at the state hole. Non-state policies are displayed panel B, which displays a much 
smaller amount of variation between counties. 
Figure 3: Number of Solar Incentivizing Policies  
Panel A                                    Panel B 
                                     
3.3 Solar Insolation 
To measure the amount of potential a given county has to generate electricity from solar radiation, I use 
annual solar insolation, the cumulative kilowatts per square meter per day. This data is collected and 
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distributed by NREL31 and produced by the State University of New York/Albany satellite radiation 
model. This data is available at 10 kilometer resolution, and each county’s annual average values are 
calculated using ArcGIS’s spatial statistics toolbox. These averages are displayed in figure 4. 
Figure 4: Average Solar Insolation 
 
3.4 Environmental Preference 
To capture county residents’ environmental preferences, I use results from the US Presidential elections. 
Coan and Holman (2008) demonstrate how there has been a long established and intuitive correlation 
between Democratic Party voting and environmental concern. Further, in his first presidential term and 
during the 2012 election campaign, President Obama frequently made mention of themes of climate 
change, energy independence, renewable resources, and a ‘green’ economy. While the decision for a 
single office will be a selection of a number of non-policy issues, and thus provide a weaker proxy for a 
single preference, given the recent rise in political polarization in the US the difference in voting record 
from individual elections will likely matter less.  
I also include the number of Whole Foods locations in each county to further capture environmental 
preference is. Whole Foods is an upscale food retailer, specializing in food certified as natural and/or 
organic. It caters to a population with a willingness to pay higher prices for food perceived to be healthier 
and more ethically produced, which is assumed to be highly correlated with the environmental 
                                                     
31 Available: http://www.nrel.gov/gis/data_solar.html 
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preferences that would drive solar adoption. To my knowledge, this is the first time Whole Food locations 
have been used to measure environmental performance. However many similar measures have been used, 
such as organic food sales and hybrid and electric vehicle penetration (Crago and Chernyakhovskiy, 
2014). 
3.5 Electricity Prices, County Demographics 
Average residential electricity prices come from EIA’s Form 861, which provide average electricity 
prices at the residential level from each utility, which are averaged at the state level. County demographic 
information comes from US Census’ American Community Survey, using the American FactFinder 
website32. Using their five year ACS estimates33, I use income per capita and county median age. 
Summary statistics for demographic information and all other variables are displayed at the county level 
in Table 1.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
4. Empirical Model  
A limitation of the model in equation (1) is that it ignores any spatial influence on the adoption of solar 
power. As explained in the previously cited literature, there are likely strong spatial influences in an 
empirical model estimating the adoption of residential solar, from peer effect causing industry and/or 
adoption clustering. Failing to include influential explanatory variables into the model would create 
                                                     
32 Available: http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/searchresults.xhtml?refresh=t 
33 Sampled over five years: 2009-2014 
Variable Mean Stdv Min Max
Capacity 3810.708 17691.01 0 202219.9
Population 182443.9 652019 485 1.01E+07
WattsPC 1.180418 1.56461 0 5.182375
LocalPol 5.175309 6.155283 0 25
PCIncome 40350.32 13185.71 21779 194485
lnPCIncome 10.57138 0.2420296 9.988702 12.17811
PctDem 39.03862 16.77843 5.772967 93.38633
WhlFds 0.3555556 1.6441441 0 26
ElectPr 11.57128 2.240555 8.67 16.25
MedAge 40.58296 7.00558 23 61.2
Homeowner 68.92686 8.102741 36.60472 92.92375
wBach 25.40346 10.26913 7.5 67.8
SolPot 5783.208 1135.074 2912.353 8020.807
NumOwd 36990.74 110930.2 165 1503915
lnNumOwn 8.946272 1.719836 5.105946 14.22358
Detached 70.7642 9.507747 20 93.9
StatePol 8.659259 5.755965 3 21
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omitted variable bias (LeSage and Pace, 2009). To test the spatial effects presented in equation (1), I 
generate a Moran’s I statistic34, and in comparing it to a chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of 
freedom, I strongly reject the null hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation. 
4.1 Spatial Hierarchical Methodology  
Given this significant presence of spatial autocorrelation, I follow Balta-Ozkan et al. (2015) in applying 
spatial econometric methods to solar PV market, modeled in equation (1). I start with the Spatial Durban 
Model (SDM), which controls for spatial autocorrelation of the dependent variable as well as the spatially 
weighted independent variables: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 +𝑊𝑋𝑖𝛩 + 𝜖𝑖   ,   𝜖𝑖 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) (2) 
where 𝑋 is an nxk matrix of independent variables for each county. 𝑊 is a binary nxn spatial weight 
matrix describing contiguous neighbors created from Delaunay triangles, and 𝜌 is the average spatial 
spillover of the dependent variable. For global models, with spatial spillovers propagating over the entire 
sample area, the SDM is preferred over more common spatial models including the Spatial 
Autoregressive Model (SAR) and the Spatial Error Model (SEM): As the SDM nests both the SAR and 
SEM, it will produce unbiased coefficients even if the true DGP is the SAR or SEM (see LeSage and 
Pace, 2009). Conversely, using a SAR or SEM when the true DGP is an SDM will lead to either omitted 
variable bias or a loss in efficiency, or both (Ellhorst, 2010). 
In this application, a serious limitation to these common spatial approaches comes from the structure of 
the data: individual counties are nested within states. In addition, each state’s unique governance and 
legal structure affects the residential PV market differently. From the production and/or importing of the 
solar panels, to the construction permitting process, to the connection to the electrical grid, there are a 
myriad of levels of regulation that an installation of solar panels must go through. Capturing this 
significant source of heterogeneity among individual states is necessary to understand any policy effect. 
Given this, I apply a hierarchical SDM model similar to that proposed in Lacombe and McIntyre (2016). 
At the first level, counties within the WECC, I model: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑗 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦𝑖 + Δ𝛼𝑗 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 +𝑊𝑋𝑖𝛩 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗   ,   𝜖𝑖𝑗  ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) (3) 
                                                     
34 Moran’s I Statistic: 5.146, p-value: 0.000 
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where 𝛼 represents the policy effect that at the county level by the individual state in which they are 
located. Modeling this parameter happens at the second level, States within the WECC, modeled as: 
𝛼𝑗 = 𝑍𝑗𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖    ,   𝜖𝑖𝑗 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜏
2) (4) 
In this equation 𝑍 is a 13x2 matrix, with the rows representing the 13 states in the sample area, and the 
columns depicting a constant term as well as the given state’s solar incentive policies. 
Given this model, we define the full posterior distribution as follows: 
𝜋(𝛩, 𝛼|𝑦) ∝ |𝐴|𝜎−𝑁exp {
1
2
(𝐴𝑦 − Δ𝛼 − 𝐷ζ )′𝐶𝛽
−1(𝐴𝑦 − Δ𝛼 − 𝐷ζ )} 
(5) 
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−1(𝛾 − 𝑑)} 
(10) 









−1  ≡ (𝜎2𝐼𝑛)
−1, 𝐶𝛽
−1  ≡ (𝜏2𝐼𝑛)
−1, 𝐴 ≡ (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊), and 𝐷ζ ≡ [𝑋𝛽 ,𝑊𝑋Θ]. 𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 are 
the smallest/largest eigenvalue of 𝑊. The typical row-standardization of 𝑊 renders the value of 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
1. Equations 4 and 5 depict the likelihood functions for both level 1 and level 2 respectively. Priors for 
level-one error variance (𝜎) and parameters (𝛽) are represented in equations 6 and 7. For level two, 
priors for the error variance (𝜏) and parameters (𝛾) are found in equations 8 and 9. MCMC methods, 





4.2 Estimation Results 
Estimates for the values of 𝛽, 𝜎, 𝛼, 𝛾, 𝜏, and 𝜌 are presented in table X. Results suggest a moderate but 
significant amount of spatial autocorrelation in the model (𝜌 = .38). While Pace et al. (2012) find much 
higher 𝜌 values (upwards of .95) in many economic factors such as income and production, at the county 
level spillovers are still an important part of the market: this results suggests that in the sample area when 
a county increased its solar PV capacity by 10W per capita, neighboring counties will increase theirs by 
an average of 3.8W per capita. This supports arguments put forth above about the importance of both peer 
effects and spatial clustering in the residential solar market.  
State policies are found to have a positive effect on residential adoption - the positive coefficient on 𝛾2 
suggests that the relationship between state policies and PV adoption in the eastern US found by Crago 
and Chernyakhovskiy (2014) likely hold in the west as well.  
Table 2: Bayesian Coefficient Estimates 
 
With frequentist statistics, parameters are assumed fixed while the data varies. However with Bayesian 
statistics, the data is presumed fixed while parameters are allowed to follow some distribution. This 
allows the investigation of the distribution of individual parameters. For our parameter of interest, local 
policies, the full distribution is presented in figure 5: 
  
Variable Name Coefficient Variable Name Coefficient Variable Name Coefficient
β 1 LocalPolicy 0.0747 β 11 W*LocalPolicy 0.0044 α . 0.3945
β 2 lnPersInc -0.0253 β 12 W*lnPersInc 0.1311 σ . 0.9489
β 3 PctDem -0.002 β 13 W*PctDem 0.0065 р . 0.3776
β 4 WholeFoods -0.0474 β 14 W*WholeFoods 0.0148 γ 1 Constant -0.1216
β 5 ElectricityPrices 0.0682 β 15 W*ElPrices 0.1075 γ 2 StatePol 0.0746
β 6 MedAge 0.0229 β 16 W*MedAge -0.0047 τ . 0.4249
β 7 wBach 0.0173 β 17 W*wBach -0.0314
β 8 SolPot 0.0003 β 18 W*SolPot -0.0003
β 9 Detached -0.0006 β 19 W*Detached -0.0217
β 10 lnNumOwn 0.1489 β 20 W*lnNumOwn 0.0062
β 21 Constant -3.4657
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Figure 5: Distribution of 𝛽2, Sub-State Policies 
 
The Gibbs-sampler produced 100,000 iterations (200,000 total, with 100,000 discarded). While 
suggestive of a positive relationship, it is important to note that the interpretation of non-SEM spatial 
econometric models requires more care than is generally given. Producing the marginal effects from the 
SAR requires simple algebra to generate its reduced form: 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜖 
𝑦𝑖 − 𝜌𝑊𝑦𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜖 
𝑦𝑖(𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜖 
 
 𝑦𝑖 = (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)
−1𝑋𝑖𝛽 + (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)
−1𝜖 (12) 
Partially differentiating the reduced form equation with respect to 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 produces: 
𝜕𝑦𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= 𝑆(𝑊) =  (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)
−1𝑋𝑖 
(13) 
where 𝑆(𝑊) is an nxn matrix displaying the all marginal effects on 𝑦𝑖 from a change in 𝑥𝑖. The diagonal 
elements in this matrix are the marginal effects from county 𝑖 on the dependent variable in county 𝑖, 
known as the direct effects. The off-diagonal elements in 𝑆(𝑊) are the effects on the dependent variable 
in county 𝑖 from a change in the independent variable in county 𝑗, called the indirect effects. Total effects 
sum direct and indirect. While each individual effect can be calculated, LeSage and Pace (2009) 
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recommend presenting the average total, direct, and indirect effects. Accordingly, the marginal effects are 
presented following this method below. 
Table 3: Marginal Effects  
 
The direct, indirect, and total effect estimate of each level-one variable is presented, along with the upper 
and lower limits of its 95% credible interval. The first row presents the average effect estimates for local 
policies. These results suggest that an additional solar policies at the city, county, and utility level in 
county i are associated with an increase in installed residential solar PV capacity per capita by 7.7%. 
However given the significant spatial autocorrelation estimated in this model, a policy in county i also 
affects neighboring counties. The average indirect effect of local policies (a policy in county i’s effect 
across neighboring counties) averages a cumulative 5.0% increase. Combined, an average sub-state policy 
is associated on average with a 12.7% increase in per capita capacity in both the county in which it is 
enacted as well as all neighboring counties.  
This lends support to the arguments put forth in Burkhardt et al. (2015) and Dong and Wiser (2013) that 
local policies are an important driver of solar adoption. An important distinction is that this study only 
considers renewable policies, whereas these earlier studies use a more comprehensive set of local 
construction, connection, and permitting policies. Nevertheless, these results should help direct attention 
of local municipality and county policies as an important component of residential PV adoption. That 
there is no significant effect in the change of neighboring counties suggests that the clustering found in 
Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) is likely limited to within county effects. It is worth noting that these 
policy impacts likely go beyond adoption: Joern et al. (2013) demonstrate how while incentive policies 
increase innovation at the firm level, they could be raising the barrier to market entry for new firms.  
Variable Direct Lower 95%Upper 95% Indirect Lower 95%Upper 95% Total Lower 95%Upper 95%
LocalP 0.0772 0.0544 0.0999 0.0499 -0.0111 0.1107 0.1271 0.0625 0.1911
lnPers 0.0159 -0.5841 0.5518 0.1858 -1.3681 1.727 0.1699 -1.4694 1.8113
PctDem -0.0016 -0.011 0.0079 0.0087 -0.0134 0.031 0.0072 -0.015 0.0294
WhFds -0.0476 -0.1184 0.024 -0.0047 -0.2649 0.2548 -0.0523 -0.3331 0.2288
PrElect 0.0785 -0.096 0.2545 0.2039 -0.0418 0.4515 0.2824 0.1171 0.45
MedAge 0.0231 0.0029 0.0431 0.0059 -0.0415 0.0533 0.0291 -0.0181 0.0762
wBach 0.0154 0.0008 0.03 -0.038 -0.0752 -0.001 -0.0226 -0.0603 0.0151
SolPot 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0007 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003
Detach -0.0023 -0.0152 0.0107 -0.0336 -0.0678 0.0004 -0.0359 -0.0715 -0.0005
lnNumOwn 0.1537 0.0627 0.2445 0.0954 -0.1472 0.3377 0.2491 -0.0015 0.497
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The impact of average solar insolation is positive and significantly different than zero35 in total estimates. 
This relationship seems intuitive and indeed potentially overshadowing other relationships: especially in 
the WECC region, greater amounts of solar insolation would decrease the time required to pay off the 
upfront investment. However these results suggest that while it is an important consideration, there are 
other salient factors. Germany for example, with roughly the solar potential of Seattle, leads the world in 
installed solar PV capacity. Even in cold and cloudy areas, electricity can be generated using solar PV. 
With sufficient interest, policy incentive and financial resources, a household could still be willing to 
install a PV system even with relatively limited solar insolation.  
The coefficient for wealth, personal income per capita, has the expected sign on its effect estimates, 
however there is a wide variability in each’s credible interval. Per capita personal income be capturing the 
wealth effect, as the decision to pay for installations comes at the household level. In some counties in the 
WECC, there are high levels of inequality, such that per capita income would be quite low while some 
individuals would have sufficient resources to devote to a PV installation. Further, it’s important to note 
the dependent variable, installed capacity, is normalized on population. Areas with higher population 
densities generally have higher incomes, so increasing wealth would be associated with both higher levels 
of residential capacity as well as population. In this model, two variables correlated with wealth, age and 
education, are both positively associated with per capita installed capacity. It could be that this wealth 
effect is being captured by these other covariates.  
Similarly, the effect estimates of the environmental awareness variables are not significantly different 
from zero. This could be because the percent voting for a popular presidential candidate and number of 
Whole Foods installations are not good indicators of environmental preference, however it is more likely 
that there are high correlations between environmental preference and wealth and education. Median 
county age though is found to be significantly different than zero. Given its correlations with wealth, this 
may be capturing some of wealth’s effect on the residential market.  
The positive and significant total value for electricity prices lends weight to the idea that residential solar 
PV capacity and electricity are substitutes, however it is not clear in which direction the causality runs. It 
is intuitive that higher electricity prices would push homeowners to consider alternative electricity 
options, however it could very well be the case (as argued by many utilities frustrated with renewable 
integration) that the integration of residential capacity raises costs.  
                                                     
35 Here defined as zero lying outside of the 95% credible interval in the specific effect estimate 
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Both the percent detached homes as well as the number of units owned in a county have the predicted 
positive signs on their direct effects, however only the units are significantly different than zero. These 
effect estimates remain positive in the indirect and total effects, however there is a wider degree of 
variability. The percent detached has no discernable indirect or total effect, as nearly equal mass of the 
distribution of the effects lie on either side of zero.   
6. Conclusions 
This paper has contributed to the literature by empirically demonstrated how sub-state policies are 
important drivers of residential solar PV adoption. Focusing on the largest residential solar market, I 
created a unique dataset identifying the location of utility, county, and municipality solar incentive 
policies, and exploit their variation to examine their effects on known residential installations. Given the 
nested structure of the data (counties within states), I turn to a hierarchical model which incorporates both 
the unobserved heterogeneity at the state level but also impact that state policies and electricity prices 
have on the residential PV market. Given the spatial autocorrelation and peer effects found in earlier 
studies, I also utilize spatial econometric methods to evaluate the spatial spillovers in the market, which 
while moderate are found significant.  
There are a number of important policy considerations from this study. First, a larger focus on local 
policies and regulations is warranted when considering residential markets. Potential consumers may have 
a better familiarity of local incentive policies available to them, and those on the margin are likely more 
influenced by the policies they know. Second, proponents of policies to promote residential solar PV 
adoption may do well to focus their efforts towards sub-state governments. There the potential to enact 
policy change might be significantly lower than at the state level, as county commissioners are likely 
more accessible and amenable to lobbying efforts. Third, residential solar firms may do well to focus their 
marketing efforts in areas with already high levels of installed capacity, where they could capture the 
peer-effects and spatial clustering of residential systems. Given the significant spatial autocorrelation 
displayed in the market, they may well already be doing so.  
This study is limited in a number of ways. Only statistical associations are produced by this paper: there is 
some potential for endogeneity in this study: policy makers could be enacting incentive policies in areas 
where solar already has a noticeable presence. Future work, similar to Crago and Chernyakhovskiy (2014) 
discerning the causal relationship is needed for the sub-state level. As mentioned above, this research 
design is unable to capture the effect of tiered electricity prices and may be omitting an important driver. 
This study treats all policies as homogeneous, which is unlikely to be the case. One net-metering policy 
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may be more favorable than another, whereas PACE financing might offer more incentives in some areas. 
This variation within and between policy categories is not captured, but could be part of future work. 
Further, this study was not able to incorporate local permitting or regulatory process efficiency, which 
may explain a large share of solar PV adoption. However even with these limitations, this study presents 
new evidence that local renewable policies are a significant driver of solar PV adoption. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This dissertation has examined three aspects of electricity generation. From the decline of the coal 
industry, the rapid rise of shale resources in the natural gas market, and the policy drivers of solar PV, I 
have provided a better and more nuanced view of three methods of generation that both have been and 
will be important to the state of West Virginia. This dissertation will be useful to anyone interested in 
state energy policy, as understanding how changes in policies have led to considerable changes in each of 
these markets. Similarly, anyone interested in competitive energy markets could benefit from this 
research.  
My second chapter investigates the extent to which acid rain regulations created by the federal 
government, once outside market forces are controlled for, are still associated with the declines in 
production seen in in the Eastern coal industry. I control for the effect that regulation and market forces 
had on mine closures, and then empirically demonstrate how the effect of these regulations were felt 
differently even within the Appalachian and Illinois basins. I also show the mitigating impact that the 
installation of scrubber units had on production. This provides a more nuanced view of the federal 
government’s role in the decline in coal production, and often contentious issue in the state. 
My third chapter models the natural gas industry, paying particular attention to the changes brought about 
by the rapid increase in production from shale resources. I model how the fundamental relationships in 
the market have changed since the formal deregulation of the industry in 1993. I also am able to model 
changes in the elasticities associated with both supply and demand for natural gas, and investigate the 
importance of specific supply and price disruptions in the past 25 years. These results should be of 
interest to anyone involved with natural gas markets or modeling their ubiquitous impact on the US 
economy. This issue is also of particular relevance to West Virginia, a state that has seen dramatic 
increases in production from shale resources in the past 10 years.  
The effect of sub-state level policies on the adoption of residential solar PV capacity is the topic of my 
fourth chapter. Focusing on one of the largest solar markets in the world, the US southwest, I evaluate the 
impact of policies at the state, county, municipality, and utility level, finding that local policies have a 
positive and significant effect on both the number of installations and the total capacity of residential solar 
PV at the county level. Further, the spatial autocorrelation in the residential PV market is found to be 
moderate but significant. These results are an important contribution to the literature: by highlighting a 
previously overlooked area of policy, my results will help direct attention and research more towards sub-
state policies when considering the residential solar market. This is also the first empirical application of a 
Bayesian spatial hierarchical model.  
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In sum, this dissertation contributes to the academic literature by applying econometric techniques to 
questions concerning the economics of energy production. I take three production methods and provide 
answers to three important questions: After controlling for market forces, how much of the decline in 
eastern coal production is attributable to federal acid rain regulation? How have the fundamental 
relationships in the natural gas market changed over the last 25 years, especially given the rise of 
production from shale resources? And how do have sub-state policies affected the adoption of residential 
solar PV? These three questions are especially salient to the state of West Virginia, a state currently 
facing tough choices about the trade-offs of energy production. This research will help inform current and 
future policy decisions for the state, region, and nation.  
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